(4.)

THE REASON WHY.

IN

ANSWER

TO

A PAMPHLET

ENTITLED,

"WHY DO WE GO TO WAR?"

TO WHICH IS AFFIXED,

A REJOINDER TO THE REPLY OF THE AUTHOR OF "WHY DO WE GO TO WAR?"

Now all the youth of England are on fire,
And ſilken dalliance in the wardrobe lies;
Now thrive the armourers, and honour's thought
Reigns ſolely in the breaſt of every man.

HENRY V. Act 2.

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THE REASON WHY,

&c.

AN extraordinary publication has juſt made its appearance, aſking as abſurd a queſtion as can well be put to the common ſenſe of the Britiſh empire, viz. "Why do we go to war?" It might as well be aſked, Why do we wiſh to preſerve our privileges and enjoyments as individuals, or our honour and independence as a nation? True it is, that the author, whoſoever he may be, has taken abundance of time to ponder over the ſubject before he ventured to make his lucubrations public, and has, no doubt, carefully rummaged every corner of his brain in queſt of ſome ſpecious argument in excuſe for his profound ignorance, or in extenuation of his inflexible ſcepticiſm, or in defence of his wilful miſrepreſentation.

I was, I own, rather curious to ſee, eſpecially as the work is attributed, if not to a loyal ſubject, at leaſt to an expert diſputant, what could poſſibly be advanced in ſupport of the opinion which was indicated by the title-page; which I knew was in direct contradiction to poſitive facts; and which was conſequently untenable by any fair mode of reaſoning. But the peruſal of it, notwithſtanding the labour of the author to aſſume a plauſible ground, has only ſerved to convince me more firmly, that the queſtion, with regard to the preſent war, is ſo clear and unembarraſſed, ſo broadly founded on the common ſenſe, and ſo immediately applying to the common feeling, of mankind, that no ingenuity or art can twiſt it into an oppoſite direction, or mould it into a contrary ſhape. There are, however, ſome men ſo cloſely wedded to their own falſe ſyſtems, and ſo deſirous of gaining proſelytes to their abſurdities, that, in their efforts to repreſent things as they wiſh them in reality to exiſt, rather than abandon their hopes and views, when they are unable to convince by argument, they ſtrive to miſlead by ſubterfuge.

Such ſeems to be the ſcope which our author has allowed to his talents; and ſuch being the miſchievous purpoſe of his pamphlet, although not written with any extraordinary degree of acumen, or in a manner to produce the ſmalleſt impreſſion on the minds of well-informed people; yet as, by

falling into the hands of the illiterate, it might, if unanſwered, operate with a prejudicial tendency on their judgments, I have undertaken briefly to examine it, and to expoſe the fallacy, inconſiſtency, and miſrepreſentation which it contains.

Our author opens the ſcene by informing us, that the laſt war brought us to the "brink of a precipice*;" and his humanity is exceſſively ſhocked, that we ſhould be ſo ſoon "again involved in a conflict that has every appearance of being more ferocious, more inveterate than the laſt;" and which, of courſe, in *his* opinion, muſt inevitably plunge us into the abyſs.

I certainly am as averſe from war, abſtractedly conſidered, as any man. I as plainly perceive its miſeries, andas ſincerely lament its neceſſity. But, when I declare this, I at the ſame time contend that there may be ſituations to which the calamities of war, great and terrible as they unqueſtionably are, muſt comparatively be regarded as bleſſings. When, therefore, we perceived that ſuch a ſituation, the bare contemplation of which creates horror, was rapidly preparing for us, and that we could only eſcape from it by a prompt reſolution to reſiſt; when we had reached ſuch perilous extremities; when, after being long deluded, we

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ſuddenly awoke to a juſt apprehenſion of the dangers which were hemming us in; ſurely, between the choice of ſuch alternatives, no wiſe, or prudent, or brave, or honourable man, could allow himſelf to heſitate for a moment. Under ſuch urgent circumſtances, he would not ſtop before he decided (as our author would have him) to deliberate on queſtions of finance, or to aſcertain the extent of the taxes, and the amount of the national debt; but, convinced of the imperious neceſſity of inſtantaneous exertion, the ſtrongeſt impulſe of his feelings would be the diſcharge of his duty, and the only object of his ſolicitude the ſalvation of his country. Other conſiderations may be poſtponed with ſafety; but to demur about the aſſertion of national independence is a deſperate experiment.

Our author ſays, that, ſituated as we were, "the cauſe *ſhould* have been the moſt obvious, the moſt ſtriking to the ſenſes of every individual in the kingdom, from the well-informed politician to the meaneſt mechanic, the ſimpleſt peaſant of the land; a cauſe that ſhould have urged him to ſnatch the firſt hedge-ſtake in his way to oppoſe an inſulting and aggreſſive foe *." And was it not ſuch a cauſe, in the jndgment of every inhabitant in the kingdom, ſave a few, who (from what *good* motives I know not) ſide with our au-

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thor? Has not nearly *every* politician, *every* mechanic, *every* peaſant, not by a mute and ambiguous aſſent, but by the deciſive teſtimony of active loyalty and patriotic zeal, which he has voluntarily diſplayed, confirmed the aſſertion? Has not the generous emulation with which all ranks and deſcriptions of people have ſtood forward, an emulation manifeſted in different ways, according to their different means, unparalleled in the hiſtory of mankind, and which has induced them cheerfully to ſacrifice all private eaſe and advantage to a ſenſe of public duty, borne evidence to the fact? If ever a war were juſt and neceſſary, and if ever an opinion of that juſtice and neceſſity could be plainly demonſtrated by the general voice and action of a nation, in what manner could it be more triumphantly expreſſed than it has been on the preſent occaſion?

Our author next finds fault with the meſſage of the 8th of March, and tells us, there could be no juſt cauſe of alarm, becauſe there were at that time "but two frigates in the roads of Holland, and but three corvettes in the roads of Dunkirk*." And are theſe then the only two places to be diſcovered along the extenſive and formidable range of coaſt which is ſubject to the power and influence of France? Was ſhe not fitting out large

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armaments at Helvoetſluys* and Fluſhing? Was ſhe inactive at Havre, Cherburg, Breſt, and Toulon, her great naval arſenals? Had not the recruiting ſervice been carried on with unabated diligence, and even by extraordinary levies, in every department of the republic? Had not a plan of aggreſſion, perſecution, and ſpoliation, been ſyſtematically adopted towards other ſtates? Had *we* not been repeatedly inſulted and aggrieved in various ways? Had not our rights been queſtioned, our claims rejected, and every ſatisfaction refuſed? Had not the Chief Conſul publicly boaſted to the Legiſlative Body and to the Britiſh

* If, as Talleyrand declared on the 11th of March 1803, the expedition of Helvoetſluys were deſtined for America†, how came Louiſiana to be ceded to the United States on the 30th of the following month ‡? On a meaſure of ſuch importance as the transfer of this valuable province, a correſpondence muſt have been kept up between France and the United States, in order to ſettle the terms. The meſſage of the 8th of March, no doubt, haſtened its concluſion, and probably induced France to abandon her views in that quarter of the globe; but whichever way it be taken, it is clear, that the French cabinet was acting with perfidy either towards America or us. If the expedition were deſtined for Louiſiana, it was a breach of faith towards America, whilſt a negotiation was pending for its ceſſion. If it were not, the declaration that it *was*, was a breach of faith towards us.

† *Correſpondence. Verbal Note, No.* 42.
‡ *Ditto, Part II. No.* 21.

Ambaſſador of his military force, and of what it was able and willing to accompliſh? Did all theſe concurring circumſtances afford no juſt ground of jealouſy, precaution, or diſtruſt? Were they to be regarded as the common occurrences of the day, matters of mere indifference, and, as ſuch, totally unworthy of our notice?

Having diſmiſſed theſe preliminary topics, our author now enters into what he would fain make appear an impartial and candid inveſtigation of the eight principal cauſes of diſpute, as ſtated in his Majeſty's Declaration; and, by garbling a few unconnected paſſages from the maſs of correſpondence, ſuch as he is conſcious will beſt ſuit his purpoſe, he labours hard to ſhew, that the conduct of France has been temperate, dignified, and ſincere, and that of Britain haſty, inſulting, and perfidious. But, in ſpite of the aid which he has occaſionally derived from this unfair mode of repreſentation, he has completely failed in the concluſions he has, with ſo much anxiety, attempted to eſtabliſh. This I ſhall very eaſily prove.

In this regular attack, he begins by ſaying, "The firſt, and perhaps the heavieſt (charge) reſpects the confiſcation of our merchant-ſhips *." This certainly was no ſlight cauſe of complaint;

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but our author endeavours to explain it away by remarking, that "in the early part of the laſt war the French prohibited the importation of Engliſh goods and manufactures, which prohibition they did not think proper to take off at the peace;" and further, "that they had an undoubted right to make what regulations and reſtrictions they pleaſed *." As far as their own country was concerned, they certainly had the *right*. But does poſſeſſing the right always juſtify the exertion of it? It was ſurely natural to expect that a rigid prohibition †, which had been enacted during war, and which had ariſen out of the very circumſtance of the hoſtile ſituation of the two countries, ſhould terminate at the reſtoration of peace. But if, after the ceſſation of hoſtilities, inſtead of its repeal, or even its mitigation, we find it as obſtinately perſevered in, and as rigorouſly enforced as ever, to put the mildeſt conſtruction on ſuch a conduct, it muſt be obvious that it betrayed a malevolent and unfriendly diſpoſition. It avowed a determination to continue the injury, after the cauſe for which it had been inflicted was removed; and although a formal act of

* Page 5.

† This law was paſſed at a period of peculiar inveteracy, in 1794, during the uſurpation of the ferocious Robeſpierre. Its continuance was well worthy of the uſurpation of his ſucceſſor, the ferocious Buonaparte.

reconciliation had been ratified, it ſeemed deſigned to keep alive, inſtead of burying in oblivion, not only the remembrance but the inconveniences and penalties of paſt animoſity. But this was not all: theſe ſymptoms of an alienated and malignant mind were not left to mere negative ſuſpicion; they were confirmed and aggravated by overt acts.

By the treaty of Amiens, it was expreſſly ſtipulated, that all ſequeſtrations impoſed in France and England, on the property of the ſubjects of the reſpective empires, ſhould, on the ratification of peace, be immediately taken off*; and it was clearly implied, that an open and amicable communication ſhould be reſtored, and that every facility ſhould be afforded, which was likely to cement a mutually good underſtanding between the two countries. We faithfully and punctually performed our part; but the French government not only refuſed to extend the ſame rights to Britiſh ſubjects, but, in defiance of the reiterated remonſtrances of the Britiſh Miniſter, which they never deigned to anſwer, continued to inſult our flag, and ſeize our ſhips. They not only denied us thoſe privileges which they had agreed to allow, but ſingling us out as objects of particular antipathy, they, in numerous inſtances, liberally granted to every other country what they

* Definitive Treaty, Art. 14.

rigorouſly withheld from us. They not only objected to enter into any commercial arrangement with us themſelves, but they openly exerted all their authority and influence to interrupt or diſſolve our connexion with other ſtates. Severe as their laws actually were againſt this country, they did not conceive it neceſſary merely to adhere to the proviſions they contained, but, in order more effectually to haraſs and injure our trade, they ſtrained them far beyond any conſtruction they would bear. Not content with ſeizing veſſels, on board of which was Britiſh property, coming within four leagues of the French coaſt, which they had decreed were liable to confiſcation, they equally captured and condemned thoſe which contained *no* Britiſh property, which had been driven into their harbours by ſtreſs of weather, and for which no latitude of interpretation could furniſh them with the ſlighteſt pretence *. Was this the part of a friend? Was it even the part of a neutral? Was it not the part of a foe? I ſee no reaſon to preſume, as our author does, that our government was ſatisfied as to theſe points. They might not, indeed, have conſidered them as likely to lead to a rupture; they might have hoped that the French government would at laſt have yielded to the

* On theſe intereſting ſubjects, ſee the Correſpondence, from p. 177 to p. 189.

juſtice of their claims. But as to their being ſatisfied, the direct contrary is proved, not only by the repeated applications and remonſtrances of Mr. Jackſon and Mr. Merry, but alſo by thoſe of my Lord Whitworth, one of which was addreſſed to Buonaparte himſelf in the conference that took place between them in the month of February of the preſent year *. So much for the firſt charge!

The ſecond charge, our author continues, relates to the commercial agents, who, he admits, were ſent into this country, to be ſtationed at our different ſea-ports, and who, amongſt other private inſtructions (which were fortunately intercepted by the vigilance of our government), were provided with the two following:

Inſtruction 11. "You are required to furniſh a plan of the ports of your diſtrict, with a ſpecification of the ſoundings for mooring veſſels."

Inſtruction 12. "If no plan of the ports can be procured, you are to point out with what wind veſſels can come in and go out, and what is the greateſt draught of water with which veſſels can enter therein deeply laden †."

All this, however, our author profeſſes to think of very lightly, and endeavours to exculpate the French government even from the ſurmiſe of any ſiniſter motive, by obſerving, that "this inform-

* Correſpondence, No. 38. † Page 6.

ation was really neceſſary in a commercial point of view merely;" and that, as for plans of our ports, and ſoundings of our harbours, "they may be purchaſed at any good mapſeller's ſhop in London *." This may poſſibly be true: but, in the firſt inſtance, why appoint commercial agents? During the continuance of the commercial treaty, when there was a cloſe and extenſive intercourſe between the two countries, no ſuch agents were appointed, nor was their neceſſity felt. It ſurely then *does* ſeem rather paradoxical, that if the ſervices of French agents could be conveniently diſpenſed with at the former period, they ſhould be ſo abſolutely requiſite at the latter. For what were they wanted? Not for the purpoſes of trade, for none exiſted. The French government evidently, therefore, had ſome other object in contemplation. But let me further aſk, why were they diſtributed in our ſea-port towns? Why were they all ſelected, not from merchants, or from thoſe whoſe habits of life had led them to turn their minds to the inveſtigation of commercial inquiries, but from engineers and other military men, who had ſignalized themſelves in the republican army? Why was one of the moſt active and expert ordered to repair to Ireland? Why, after his eſtabliſhment there, was he fur-

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niſhed with private inſtructions, conveyed in a clandeſtine manner? Why, if the information ſought after could have been procured in any mapſeller's ſhop in London, was this circuitous mode preferred? Why, if it was to anſwer ſome commercial view *merely*, was not the Britiſh government candidly applied to? The anſwer to theſe interrogatories is obvious. The appointment alone, conſidering the circumſtances under which it took place, was ſufficient to awaken ſuſpicion. The myſtery and ſecrecy which attended it amounted almoſt to a poſitive proof of guilt. The inſtructions, which *were* intercepted, fell by chance into our hands. They are not of the moſt harmleſs caſt; and from what they diſcloſe, is it not fair to infer that others, of a ſtill more offenſive tendency, eſcaped detection? And do they not lead us to gueſs at the nature of the inſtructions theſe emiſſaries received antecedent to their departure from France? If they were innocent, why did the French ſo quietly acquieſce in their ſudden diſmiſſal? Why did they not aſſert their innocence, and, by courting inveſtigation, remove the imputation of guilt? The fact is, ſelf-conviction told them that their intentions were diſhoneſt; and the excuſe they invented could only be regarded as an unmanly prevarication, or a bareſaced falſehood. Mr. Otto's *concilia-*

tory letter, quoted by our author *, and ſeveral other correſponding propoſitions reſpecting trade, were certainly preſented by the French government; but the moment the Britiſh government ſhewed a ſerious diſpoſition to come to a definitive ſettlement, inſurmountable obſtacles were inſtantly ſtarted by France, and ſome freſh cauſe of delay was interpoſed.

The third charge, that of deſiring us to ſend away the emigrants, is undoubtedly the leaſt important one; and our author does allow (becauſe, I ſuppoſe, it *is* the leaſt important) that we acted with "manlineſs and humanity †," in refuſing to comply ‡. This point was not, however, as our author ſtates, *immediately* abandoned: it was *repeatedly* urged by the French, and as *repeatedly* rejected by us §.

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‡ How did the late attempted negotiation at Warſaw degrade Buonaparte, and elevate Louis, even above the ſplendour of a throne! If any thing could recall the affections of the deluded ſubjects of this unfortunate monarch, and open their eyes to a juſt conception of the real character of the hypocritical tyrant who is deſtroying them, it would be the recollection of this tranſaction. Buonaparte, with all his craft, like other villains, ſometimes betrays himſelf, and nothing could have ſo fully proved even his own opinion of the weakneſs of his title.

§ See Correſpondence.

The fourth charge, requiring that the laws and conſtitution of this country ſhould be changed, relative to the liberty of the preſs, our author alſo affects to treat as a matter of perfect indifference; but from the length at which he argues it, and the pains he has beſtowed on the diſcuſſion, he proves that, in reality, he conſiders it as a matter of importance. The aim of his reaſoning is, however, evidently to acquit the French, and to criminate us. He ſays, "Let us ſee what is the complaint, and what is the requeſt, and how far it can be ſaid they have required an alteration in our laws and conſtitution. They complain, that ever ſince the concluſion of the treaty of Amiens, the Engliſh preſs has not ceaſed to calumniate and revile the French and their government, to repreſent their republic in the moſt odious and degrading light, that the people are appealed to againſt it, and inſtigated thereby to inſurrection and rebellion *.

With which of the two countries this war of words originated, I confeſs myſelf ignorant: I have, however, always underſtood that the French were the aggreſſors. This claim to priority, when both parties were ſo ready to engage, is not worth aſcertaining: but of this I am poſitive, that accuſation, ſcurrility, and recrimination of every

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kind, were wielded with infinitely more virulence and indecency by the Paris than by the London journaliſts. There was, indeed, one eſſential diſtinction which characterized the remarks that appeared in this country, and which rendered them more cuttingly offenſive; and this was, that they were, for the moſt part, founded in truth: whereas the retorts and aſperſions which were vomited forth by the Paris editors, were merely the fabrications of jealouſy, hatred, anger, and ſpleen.

Our author proceeds by ſaying, "They obſerve (that is, the French), that the particular laws and conſtitution of Great Britain are ſubordinate to the general principles of the law of nations; that if it be a right in England to allow the moſt extenſive liberty to the preſs, it is a public right of poliſhed nations, and the bounden duty of governments, to prevent, repreſs, and puniſh every attack which might, by thoſe means, be made againſt the rights, the intereſts, and the honour of foreign powers. This," our author exclaims *, "is all but too true, and, I believe, univerſally allowed." Now I believe, that if not univerſally, it is very generally *diſallowed*. What, in the firſt inſtance, has this to do with the law of nations? The law of nations means that code which, ariſing out of the law of nature, has

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been eſtabliſhed by the conſent of independent ſtates, for the adjudication of thoſe affairs, which are beyond their domeſtic juriſdiction, and which is neceſſary to the regulation and maintenance of their foreign concerns. But it is totally diſtinct from conſtitutional or municipal law, and cannot poſſibly have any control over the internal regulations of a ſeparate and independent government. Of theſe, every ſuch government muſt neceſſarily be the ſole mover and judge, accountable to no foreign power whatever, and in which no foreign power whatever can, under any poſſible pretext, claim the right of interference. If we had refuſed to the French that redreſs which the juriſprudence of the country provides, we ſhould have merited a very ſevere cenſure: but were we to new-model our laws and conſtitution, ſuch as they have happily exiſted for above a century paſt, at the peremptory demand of an alien government? Was there any thing ſo peculiarly ſacred in the character or the adminiſtration of Buonaparte, as to warrant ſo flagrant a dereliction of the obſervance of all preſcriptive modes? Were we to deviate from the ordinary rules of diſtributive juſtice; to change the eſtabliſhed forms of our tribunals; to infringe the liberties of the ſubject; to put a padlock on the tongue and pen; and to inſtitute an inquiſitorial court,

court, in which our patriotic author would, no doubt, have had a *French* judge preſide, merely becauſe eight or ten individuals had been in the habit of ſtating that the French were enſlaved, which every one perceived; that the Firſt Conſul was a tyrant, which nobody doubted; that his ambition was inſatiable, which he was every day proving; and that he had been guilty of the moſt atrocious cruelties, which had been clearly brought home to him? If our government had the power of controlling the preſs, and laying it under arbitrary reſtraints and penalties for ſuch offences as theſe, there would be an end at once of all freedom of opinion, of all political inveſtigation, and even of all hiſtorical truth. I am no advocate for the licentiouſneſs of the preſs. I freely acknowledge all its miſchief, and never wiſh to ſkreen it from merited chaſtiſement. But when exceſſes are committed, I am an advocate for that mode and meaſure of puniſhment which the known law of the land inflicts, and am a decided enemy to deſpotic fines, captious innovations, or unneceſſary retrenchments; and, above all, to thoſe which are dictated or ſuggeſted by a foreign power. Our courts were open to Buonaparte, as well as to every other perſon, and before them any one who had given him offence might have been arraigned. But whilſt he knew this, he alſo knew the weakneſs of his

cauſe. He perceived the impolicy of proſecuting a ſuit, in which all parties would have been impartially dealt with. He was aware, that a trial on ſuch points as muſt have been there inveſtigated and detailed, would have diffuſed the infamy of his character, and corroborated the proofs of his guilt. *That* was the reaſon why he was deſirous of ſome *French* method of ſtopping theſe unpalatable publications, ſuch as ſecret examination, ſecret impriſonment, ſecret torture, and ſecret death. Yet our author, who diſplays ſo much anxiety for the introduction of this intolerant ſyſtem, affirms that he is "as much attached as any man to the liberty of the preſs *."

He goes on by aſking, "Was it to be expected that the Firſt Conſul ſhould patiently and quietly endure to be ſo perſonally abuſed, and hear the people he commanded perpetually excited to revolt?" The wiſeſt plan he could have adopted, would have been that which was purſued by the Britiſh government with regard to ſimilar publications in France; which was, to take no notice of them. But the irritability of his temper preventing this prudent and dignified demeanour; if, after having interdicted their admiſſion into France, his revenge was ſtill un-

* Page 9.

ſatisfied; why did he not have recourſe to the only remedy which our government could offer, and with which, indeed, it is provided for its own defence, and apply for protection and redreſs to the laws? Were not the late Queen of France, and the late Emperor of Ruſſia, ſurely as auguſt perſonages as Buonaparte, reduced to the ſame neceſſity? And if theſe mighty potentates, deſcended from a long line of illuſtrious anceſtors, nurſed in the very cradle of pomp, accuſtomed from their earlieſt infancy to regal ſtate, and born to empire and command, could ſubmit to appeal to the integrity, and bow to the deciſion, of a Britiſh tribunal, it could not be regarded as any *peculiar* condeſcenſion or degradation for Buonaparte, the child of chance, the ſon of an obſcure family in an obſcure iſland, whoſe early life had been paſſed in indigence and neglect, who had crouched before each ſucceſſive idol, who had been the humble agent of Robeſpierre, and the ferocious executioner of Barras, to purſue the ſame courſe, and (if ſuch it could be conſidered) endure the ſame mortification. But the fact is, he was goaded by the workings of conſcious guilt; he was exaſperated by the veracity of the aſſertions in the Engliſh prints, and alſo by the perfect indifference with which our government, for a long time, continued to treat

even the official abuſe of France *. They deſpiſed the allegations of falſehood; he trembled before the narratives of truth.

Our author aſks, "what was required, or rather what was ſolicited?" for Mr. Otto's note, he obſerves, ſays, "The underſigned has in conſequence received a ſpecial order to *ſolicit* †;" and a little further on, he informs us, that we, in anſwer, "talk highly of the liberty of our preſs," and that "the French are ſilent, and mention the ſubject no more ‡."

Now one would really imagine from the above ſtatement, that the French had mentioned the matter *once* §; that they had preferred an humble

* The firſt paper taken notice of by our government, was Sebaſtiani's Report.

† Page 9. ‡ Page 10.

§ By a reference to the Moniteur, the nature and extent of the French *official* abuſe may be ſeen. But the moſt ſcandalous libels appeared in the Argus, a paper printed at Paris, in Engliſh, and the only one that was latterly allowed to be circulated in France in that language. The proprietors of it were an abandoned ſet of Engliſh and Iriſh renegadoes and traitors, who had ſaved themſelves by flight from the juſtice of their country, and whoſe object was to vilify and defame the king, the government, the laws, the conſtitution, and the people, of the Britiſh empire. They were, nevertheleſs, openly patronized by the French government, and their paper was publiſhed and circulated under their auſpices. To render it more peculiarly offenſive, it was conducted with augmented aſperity, at the very moment Mr. Otto was preferring his complaints in his *ſoliciting* note.

ſolicitation; that we had returned a haughty anſwer; that they had acquieſced; and that nothing more had been ſaid about it. What, then are we to think of the candour of our author, when, on referring to the Official Correſpondence, we diſcover that, even in the very document he has ventured to quote, Mr. Otto, the humble Mr. Otto, repreſents the matter as a very ſerious offence *; that Talleyrand, in a converſation with Lord Whitworth, gives him to underſtand that the Firſt Conſul is highly incenſed †; that the Firſt Conſul himſelf, in his conference with Lord Whitworth, declares that "to *preſerve peace*, the abuſe in the public prints muſt, if not *totally ſuppreſſed*, at leaſt be kept within bounds, and confined to Engliſh papers ‡;" and that General Andreoſſi, in an elaborate note preſented to Lord Hawkeſbury, the 29th of March 1803, not only inveighs againſt journaliſts and pamphleteers, but againſt the *ſpeeches of ſome leading Members of Parliament*, and concludes the ſubject with the modeſt propoſal, that the Britiſh preſs ſhould be put under the ſame regulations as thoſe which prevail in France §?

Our author next ſays, "There was a time, undoubtedly, when the Firſt Conſul felt anxious to

* See Correſpondence, No. 12.
† No. 35.
‡ No. 38.
§ No. 49.

obtain the good opinion and friendſhip of this country *." No doubt there was. But was there ever a time when he would have granted us his good opinion and friendſhip in return? No! We had created a deadly and unalterable hatred in his breaſt by the vigour with which we had oppoſed him, by the boundary which we had placed to his arms and his ambition. If, therefore, he was deſirous of *our* good opinion and friendſhip, it could not be from any motive of benevolence or eſteem; but that he might have a nearer proſpect of deluding us by his perfidy, and a ſafer opportunity of ſacrificing us to his revenge; that he might, under the maſk of diſſimulation, undermine our reſources, impede our views, fruſtrate our hopes, and deſtroy our independence. This, I contend, is by no means aſſuming too wide a field of ſuſpicion. In caſes of this deſcription, when the purport has been defeated, we can only reaſon from analogy. But when I look round, and obſerve the ſlavery and ruin in which (wherever he *has* ſucceeded) his profeſſions towards other ſtates have uniformly terminated, his deſigns to the prejudice of this country are ſufficiently evinced.

Whilſt contemplating the wretched and abject condition of thoſe ſtates, which have been enſnar-

* Page 10.

ed by the toils of his artifice, and cruſhed by the ſtrength of his power, which have felt the alternate operation of the tyranny of his temper, the rapacity of his avarice, and the deſolation of his cruelty; can any man be ſo baſely tame, or ſo madly fooliſh, as to confide in his aſſurances? What ſecurity can you repoſe in the promiſes of an uſurper, who has denied his God, who has abjured his religion, who has ridiculed the obligation of an oath, and whoſe career has been an uninterrupted ſucceſſion of treachery, rapine, and barbarity, ſuch as human nature never before exhibited? How were thoſe devoted countries, which are now chained down to the footſtool of his throne, enſlaved? By a baſe dereliction of their *own* duties, and a blind reliance on *his* word! And what has been their reward? Whither has he not diſpatched his miniſters of vengeance, who, like a ſwarm of locuſts, blaſt the land on which they alight? Pillage and maſſacre, profanation, obſcenity, and brutal luſt, have accompanied every ſtep. The very earth has ſeemed to groan under the burden of their crimes. Neither wealth nor poverty, ſex nor age, have been ſpared. The venerable feebleneſs of decrepitude, the intereſting helpleſſneſs of infancy, the ingenuous candour of youth, the ſupplicating tears of beauty, the ſanctity of religion, and the purity of virtue, have been equally diſregarded. Sacrilege and

blaſphemy have ſupplanted the rites of worſhip; robbery and confiſcation have ſubverted the throne of juſtice; and atrocities and abominations, which no language can delineate, have baniſhed all peace and comfort from the pale of domeſtic life. The range of nature is the empire at which his inſatiate mind graſps, and the ſufferings of the human race are the object of his keeneſt appetites. When no longer propelled by the oſtenſible motives of his profligate policy, he deſtroys from the wantonneſs of a brutal imagination, as if fearful that his dexterity ſhould be impaired by repoſe. The tender of his bounty is the ſmile of the traitor, who excites the hope, to aggravate the miſery, of his victim; and who, whilſt ſmiling, plants a dagger in his heart. Such is the character of the man, whom our author would recommend to the friendſhip of this country.

After what our author terms a re-examination of the three laſt charges, he comes to the fifth, which is that of affirming, that Great Britain cannot ſingly contend with the power of France; which he alleges, "is too puerile to be commented upon *." Standing alone, it certainly is. If, for example, the muſhroom King of Etruria had proclaimed the ſame aſſertion, we ſhould have

* Page 12.

laughed at it. If it had come, even from Buonaparte, in any other way, we ſhould have deſpiſed it. But when it was deliberately inſerted in a grave report from the executive government of France to the Legiſlative Body, in the deſign of its being circulated through Europe with all the weight and authority which ſuch a government could give to ſuch an act, it aſſumed a very different character. What could be the intention of the French cabinet in making ſuch a vaunt? It could not be to conciliate our friendſhip, to flatter our nationality, or to conſolidate our fame. But was it not to endeavour to convince Europe of the exiſtence of the fact; to degrade us in their eſtimation; to prove to them that we had degenerated from our ancient character; and that we were ſo completely exhauſted and diſmayed, that we could no longer claim a pretenſion to the high and independent ſituation by which we were formerly diſtinguiſhed. Coupled alſo as it was with other concomitant circumſtances, it was not altogether unlikely to produce ſuch an inference. Buonaparte, having previouſly inculcated the doctrine *, had already formally declared, that we had

* See the Moniteur of the 29th October 1802, in which this queſtion is diſcuſſed at length in the moſt inſolent terms. Buonaparte's obſervation to Lord Whitworth of "Vous n'avez pas le droit d'en parler à cette heure," was rather a laconic mode of ſettling ſo important a queſtion.

no longer a right to interfere in the continental concerns of Europe; and to convince us of his determination to act up to the declaration, he was parcelling out kingdoms, and principalities, and republics, at his pleasure.

Our author says, "The subsequent paragraph is more worthy our attention."

"But we have better hopes; and we believe, in the British cabinet, nothing will be listened to but the counsels of wisdom and the voice of humanity*." If this were not intended as a mockery, why was not the previous unprovoked affront omitted?

Of the sixth charge, which is the manifesto published in the Hamburgh Gazette, our author remarks, "It is not a little surprising to find inserted in the catalogue of offences, this manifesto; for, upon our demand of immediate satisfaction, every authority from the French government for the publication of it was denied, and most *completely disavowed* †." This is as much as to maintain, that, however flagrant and public any insult committed by one government towards another may be, although the fact be proved to demonstration, which, in this instance, it certainly was, if the offending government choose to disavow it, the apology is sufficient, and all

* Page 12. † Ibid.

ground of complaint is inſtantly removed. By this ſtrange mode of reaſoning, you may circulate the moſt ſcurrilous abuſe without danger, and propagate the moſt infamous falſehoods without reſponſibility. All you have to do on detection, is ſtoutly to diſown the charge, and the buſineſs is at once ſettled. It may be worth while to inquire into this affair a little further. Now, as to the fact, it appears that M. Rheinhardt, the French miniſter at Hamburgh, applied, in his official capacity, to the Senate of that city, to have inſerted in their Gazette a furious libel on the Britiſh government. They were convened extraordinarily to conſider how to act in an affair of ſuch delicacy, but they judged it prudent to comply with the demand*. "It was their wiſh that they might at leaſt be allowed to omit or qualify the moſt offenſive paſſages; but M. Rheinhardt ſaid his orders were poſitive, for the *full and exact* inſertion of the whole†." M. Rheinhardt, however, not yet ſatisfied with the ſucceſs of his exertions, applied to the magiſtrates at Altona for leave to have it alſo inſerted in their papers; who replied, "that they could not poſſibly permit it without an expreſs order from their government." In conſequence of this refuſal,

* If the Senate had inſerted ſuch a paper againſt France, at our inſtance, what would have been the fate of Hamburgh?

† See Correſpondence, No. 71.

"M. Dagueſſeau, the French miniſter at the court of Copenhagen, received from his colleague at Hamburgh, a copy of the article, with a requeſt that he would ſolicit the permiſſion of its publication in the Daniſh papers*." This was alſo refuſed. Now is it at all probable that two French miniſters, who well knew the temper and power of their maſter, ſhould have ventured, *without orders*, to have made a requiſition of ſo ſerious and unexampled a nature? and is not what followed a deciſive proof that theſe orders were tranſmitted? It was very eaſy for Talleyrand, after the purpoſe was anſwered, to deny the fact, and to ſay, "that the Firſt Conſul conſidered Rheinhardt's conduct ſo reprehenſible, that every ſatisfaction might be expected." Was any ſatisfaction given? Was the only reparation (and that but a poor one) which could be made, granted? Was the fact publicly and formally diſclaimed? Was the Senate of Hamburgh authorized to ſtate, which they would gladly have done, that the inſertion was without authority, that it was a miſunderſtanding, and that it was a groſs and ſcandalous libel? Were Rheinhardt and Dagueſſeau chaſtiſed for their inſolence? Were they diſmiſſed from their offices, or even

* Correſpondence, No. 72.

reprimanded for this pretended breach of inſtruction? The matter ſpeaks for itſelf.

A little farther on our author remarks, that "a futile argument is ſometimes made uſe of, that theſe cauſes are nothing if ſingly taken, but all together amount to a ſufficient one;" and by way, I ſuppoſe, of enlivening his page with a ſpecimen of the fecundity of his wit, he adds, "but if individually they are nothing, and are proved to be ſo, can an aggregate of *nothings* ever amount to any thing*?" Now, whatever our author's eſtimation of them may be, I really never heard any thing like ſuch an aſſertion made: and I think any man, who ſeriouſly advances it, muſt be not only deſtitute of common feeling, but of common ſenſe. In the opinion of many, each, ſeparately taken, was a ſufficient cauſe of war. In the opinion of others again, although, individually conſidered, they did not perhaps warrant an immediate recourſe to the laſt extremity, yet collectively, they furniſhed a very ſtrong caſe. And although we are infinitely obliged to our author for the information, that add nothing to nothing and nothing will be produced, yet, with his permiſſion, we may alſo be allowed the capacity to perceive, that ſeveral ſtrong points added together yield an aggregate of their united ſtrength, and that even

* Page 12.

trifling cauſes, by repetition, may at laſt amount to ſomething inſupportable.

Our author next conſiders the charge of aggrandizement, and earneſtly endeavours, though to very little purpoſe, to perſuade us that France is ſtill in the right. He inquires, "whether the ſituation of Europe was eſſentially different at the time of the meſſage, in March 1803, from what it was at the ſigning of the treaty of Amiens, March 1802 *?" I anſwer, Yes! it *eſſentially* was. Piedmont was not then annexed; the clandeſtine arrangement reſpecting Parma was unknown, and conſequently unſuſpected; the encroachments on the Germanic Body had not been finally arranged †; the independence of Switzerland, which had been ſolemnly guarantied by a recent treaty, had not been forcibly violated; and the

* Page 13.

† In the ſettlement of this iniquitous buſineſs, every one muſt be ſtruck with the large portion allotted to the King of Pruſſia, and the ſmall one acquired by the Grand Duke of Tuſcany, whoſe forfeited dominion was of ten times the value. The principal object of France, was to weaken the power of the Houſe of Auſtria, on whoſe preſervation, the liberties of the continent were chiefly dependant. In proportion as the Emperor is humbled, the King of Pruſſia, who is the tool and vaſſal of France, is rendered more formidable (I mean, of courſe, in his relation to the Germanic Body). The ſeizure of Piedmont and Switzerland, which were the chief barriers againſt invaſion, have given a fatal blow to the power and conſequence of the Auſtrian family.

agreement, which France had entered into to withdraw her troops from Holland, was expected to be punctually obſerved. And are all theſe diſappointments, all theſe ſpoliations, all theſe ſcandalous infractions of the moſt ſacred pledges by which one nation can bind itſelf to another, mere matters of indifference? In the good times of Europe, any one of theſe acts would have rouſed every other ſtate to arms, and have cemented a general league for the repreſſion and chaſtiſement of ſuch iniquitous proceedings. And becauſe other ſtates have meanly ſhrunk from *their* duty, is a powerful, an honourable, a valiant, and an independent nation like Britain to follow their retrograde and cowardly footſteps? Are we bound to repoſe confidence in the bare *aſſurances* of a government, in whoſe *acts* we can trace nothing but the moſt flagitious perfidy; which, towards every other country, has broken its plighted faith; which, whenever its ſtrength has been ſufficient to enſure impunity to crimes, has overſtepped all dictates of honour, all principles of juſtice, and all bounds of decency; and which, in addition to theſe proofs of an unprincipled mind, has, in numberleſs inſtances, teſtified an unremitting propenſity to reduce us to the ſame helpleſs and contemptible ſituation? By way of illuſtration to his mode of reaſoning, our ingenious author propounds the following queſtion: "If," ſays he,

"a man has taken my purſe, of what conſequence is it whether he holds it in his hand or puts it into his pocket*?"—So that if a thief got hold of a purſe, if he were but a *French thief* (which I take to be our author's meaning), he would have him quietly keep it, and would diſapprove of any interference which might diſappoint him of his prey. But independently of the turpitude of ſuch a doctrine, which goes to the total diſmemberment of ſocial life, the caſe is far from being a parallel one. In the above inſtances, France had never obtained an abſolute poſſeſſion. Her troops had been admitted conditionally, at leaſt by implication, and formal contracts had been ſince concluded, explicitly declaring, that the independence of the countries ſhould be inviolably preſerved†. Whether the treaties reſpecting Piedmont, Switzerland, and Holland, were negotiated with us or with any other power, was perfectly immaterial. With whomſoever they were negotiated, it was natural to ſuppoſe that they would be executed; and the treaty of Amiens being founded on a baſis which bore an immediate reference to the relative ſituation of Great Britain and France‡, any eſſential change in that ſituation, to our evident diſadvantage, be-

* Page 13.

† See the treaty of Luneville, and that between France and the Batavian republic.

‡ Correſpondence, No. 45.

came a point of proportionate conſequence to us. Did the Firſt Conſul's exclamation of "*Ce ſont des bagatelles*," alluding to Piedmont and Switzerland, diminiſh their real importance, or tranſmute the original and acknowledged principles of the treaty, thoſe conſtituent and fundamental materials on which the whole fabric was reared? Was not this country alſo peculiarly intereſted in the independence of the Batavian republic; and did it not, by the third article of the treaty of Amiens, conſent to an almoſt general reſtitution of her colonies, evidently under that impreſſion? Can the idea be for a moment entertained that it was the deſign of the Britiſh government to place all theſe rich and valuable ſettlements in the hands of our moſt dangerous rival?

Theſe unjuſtifiable pretenſions and acts on the part of France aſſumed alſo an alarming aſpect in another point of view. They, in ſome degree, developed the inſidious deſigns of the Firſt Conſul, and, by proclaiming that he was not to be reſtrained by any written agreement, they naturally awakened our jealouſies and fears, and pointed out to us the neceſſity of looking more cloſely to our own ſecurity. Our author ſays, that "Buonaparte declared he would withdraw his troops, the moment the treaty of Amiens was fully completed on our part, and Malta evacuated

according to agreement *." But, by his treaty with Holland, he was bound to withdraw his troops the moment the definitive treaty was ſigned †. No diſagreement had yet ariſen about Malta; nor were we, even ſuppoſing that all the conditions reſpecting its ſurrender had been punctually fulfilled, pledged to evacuate it before the expiration of three months. France then began the diſpute by a breach of faith, in the obſervance of which we were materially concerned. And what aſſurance or ſecurity did ſhe offer us but her mere word, which ſhe was in the conſtant habit of violating, that ſhe would on this occaſion be ſcrupulous; or how could we expect that ſhe, who in that very identical inſtance had broken her faith with Holland, would not alſo break it with Britain?

The laſt point our author muſters in review is Malta, which, in truth, is one of the moſt prominent cauſes of the preſent war. He ſays, "By the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, we appear ſpecifically and abſolutely to have agreed

* Page 15.

† We, in obedience to the treaty, delivered up Minorca and Porto Ferraio, within the period of *one* month. France, on the contrary, in defiance of the *ſpirit* of the treaty, ſeized Porto Ferraio on its being evacuated by our troops, and, in defiance of the *letter*, kept poſſeſſion of her conqueſts in the Mediterranean for *three* months.

to evacuate Malta within the ſpace of three months after the ſignature: we keep it twelve, then demand it for ten years longer; which not being complied with, we commence hoſtilities. What is our defence* ?" Certainly not ſuch a one as our author ſeems diſpoſed to make.

Although I am far from thinking that there would have been no war had no diſpute ariſen about Malta, yet I readily admit, that much diſcuſſion and altercation might have been ſpared, had the poſſeſſion of it been confirmed to us by one of the articles of the treaty. This, however, having been omitted, all we had to do was to look to the ſpecific terms on which we had agreed to ſurrender it, and to abide by them. Having put our hand and ſeal to certain conditions, we ſurely intended that the limitations and reſtrictions they preſcribed ſhould be literally obeyed. What is the meaning of a contract but to bind down the contracting parties to the obſervance of particular ſtipulations, which if not in every reſpect complied with, the bargain is annulled? If this be not the meaning of ſuch an inſtrument, where is the uſe of its intervention? for if the parties, at the time of its performance, intended to abſolve each other from its contents, the deed itſelf was in its origin a nonentity. But

* Page 16.

this is too ridiculous an abſurdity for the moſt credulous to entertain. The validity of the deed being then granted, we have only to examine the terms. They are expreſſed at conſiderable length, and bear every internal evidence of ſincerity, and even of anxiety on our part, that they ſhould be accompliſhed; and if, from no neglect or fault of ours, but in conſequence of difficulties and objections thrown out by thoſe powers who were invited to become guarantees, they were afterwards rendered impracticable, the blame could not lie with us, and we were certainly releaſed from our part of the engagement. Any other arrangement might no doubt have been concerted between the parties immediately intereſted. That was optional, but the exiſting one was to all intents and purpoſes void. But this buſineſs deſerves more minute inveſtigation.

Article 10 of the definitive treaty, about which ſo much has been ſaid, is followed, as every body knows, by thirteen ſtipulations.

The 1ſt ſays, That the knights of the Order, whoſe langues ſhall continue to ſubſiſt after the exchange of the ratifications of the preſent treaty, are invited to return to Malta, as ſoon as that exchange ſhall have taken place. They ſhall there form a general chapter, and ſhall proceed to the election of a Grand Maſter, &c.

The 2d, That, in order to preſerve the inde-

pendence of the iſland, there ſhall henceforth be no Engliſh nor French langues.

The 3d, That a Malteſe langue ſhall be eſtabliſhed, to be ſupported out of the land revenues and commercial duties of the iſland—to be endowed with peculiar privileges, which are enumerated. And it is moreover ſtipulated, that the municipal, revenue, civil, judicial, and other offices under the government of the iſland, ſhall be filled, at leaſt in the proportion of one half, by native inhabitants of Malta, Gozo, and Comino.

The 4th, That the forces of his Britannic Majeſty ſhall evacuate the iſland and its dependencies, within three months after the exchange of the ratifications, or ſooner if it can be done: at that period the iſland ſhall be delivered up to the Order in the ſtate in which it now is, provided that the Grand Maſter, or commiſſioners, fully empowered according to the ſtatutes of the Order, be upon the iſland to receive poſſeſſion; and that the force to be furniſhed by his Sicilian Majeſty, as hereafter ſtipulated, be arrived there.

The 5th, That the garriſon of the iſland ſhall at all times conſiſt at leaſt one half of native Malteſe, &c.

The 6th, That the indopendence of the iſlands of Malta, Gozo, and Comino, as well as the preſent arrangement, ſhall be under the protec-

tion and guaranty of Great Britain, France, Auſtria, Ruſſia, Spain, and Pruſſia.

Articles 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, relate to the neutrality of the iſland, and certain commercial and internal regulations.

The 12th, That his Sicilian Majeſty ſhall be invited to furniſh two thouſand men, natives of his dominions, to ſerve as a garriſon for the ſeveral fortreſſes upon the iſland, &c.

The 13th, That the ſeveral powers ſpecified in paragraph 6, ſhall be invited to accede to the preſent arrangement.—Such is the ſubſtance of the thirteen paragraphs *.

Our author obſerves, that the fourth "is the only proviſional clauſe †;" but becauſe it is the only proviſional one, is it the only obligatory one? I maintain that every one of the other clauſes is fully as binding. Is not the clauſe in queſtion couched in the ſame terms as the others? Does it not ſay, "The forces of his Britannic Majeſty *ſhall* evacuate," &c. and can the word, "*provided*," in the middle of the ſentence, impart an additional force to the word "*ſhall*" at the commencement? On the contrary, it is a qualification which evidently weakens it. It provides an additional ſtipulation, affecting that particular clauſe, but can have no reference to the con-

* See the Definitive Treaty. † Page 16.

ſtruction of the preceding or ſubſequent parts of the treaty.

The next paragraph our author mentions is the ſixth, which ſtipulates, that the independence of the iſlands ſhall be under the protection and guaranty of Great Britain, France, &c. Is this language at all equivocal? If to the ſentence, as it ſtands, had been prefixed—"provided they accept;" here would have been one of our author's proviſional clauſes, which would have done away the preſent import of the word *ſhall*; but, ſtanding alone, it is unqualified and abſolute. Our author remarks on the expreſſion, *ſhall be*, "What! whether they will conſent or not *?" The inquiry was not made; but the French, who were parties as well as ourſelves, were in cloſe intelligence with ſeveral of the propoſed guarantees, and had better opportunities than we of learning their ſentiments. But why, pray, is the "*ſhall*" in paragraph 4 to have ſuch force, and the "*ſhall*" in paragraph 6 to be diveſted of all ſignification? The anſwer is evident: becauſe it ſuits the purpoſes of our author, and of his friends the French.

Our author next jumps to paragraph 13, in which, with his accuſtomed ſagacity and impartiality, he obſerves that the powers ſpecified in

* Page 17.

paragraph 6, are *invited* to accede to the preſent arrangement. The term *invited*, he ſays, is a proof that they had the *power* to refuſe. Nobody ſurely ever thought of denying them the *power*; but we at leaſt hoped and expected that they would comply, and, at all events, were bound to put the queſtion in a civil manner. Now it is worthy of remark, that the above term occurs twice before in this particular part of the treaty reſpecting Malta; viz. in paragraph 1, the knights of the Order are *invited* to return. We were no ſurer of the *invited knights* than of the *invited guarantees*; yet if the knights, deſpiſing our invitation, had refuſed to return, would our author contend that we were bound to deliver up the iſland? To whom? to the French? Again, paragraph 12, "His Sicilian Majeſty ſhall be *invited* to furniſh two thouſand men." Here the expreſſion is identically the ſame as the one our author quarrels with above. His Sicilian Majeſty had alſo the *power* to refuſe; yet, if he had refuſed, would our author ſtill have had us evacuate the iſland, when, by ſuch a refuſal, his favourite ſolitary proviſional clauſe would have been completely invalidated? So much for the candour, and, I may add, for the logic, of our author *.

* The ſenſe which the French government ſometimes annexes to the term "invited," may be ſeen by referring to

But why were guarantees nominated, and a certain ſet of *langues* agreed on, except as a ſecurity againſt the projects of France, which we, from paſt conduct as well as preſent pretenſions, were certainly juſtified in ſuſpecting? The *langues*, however, underwent ſuch radical alterations, that their very conſtitution was vitiated, and their conſequence and independence were totally deſtroyed. Some of the priories were aboliſhed, whilſt others were deprived of their revenues; and as for the guarantees, in conſequence of the obſtinate ſilence of France, they declined acceding to our repeated applications. Now what did our repeated applications and the obſtinate ſilence of France prove? What but our ſincerity and her perfidy? Let us, for a little, examine dates, thoſe ſtubborn criteria of truth. The definitive treaty was ſigned on the 27th day of March 1802, and Malta was to be evacuated on certain conditions (one of the principal of which was, the acceſſion of the propoſed guarantees) three months poſterior to that act. On

No. 21 of the Official Correſpondence, in which it appears, that Semonville, the French ambaſſador at the Hague, in his inſolent communication to the Preſident of the Batavian government, after declaring the ſurpriſe and *indignation* of Buonaparte in conſequence of ſome *domeſtic* diſturbances, informs him, "Que le Premier Conſul, comme allié de la république, *invitoit* le gouvernement," &c.

the 15th of July at Vienna, on the 21ſt of Auguſt at Berlin, and a few days previous to the 17th of September at Peterſburgh, we find, from the official communications of our miniſters at theſe reſpective courts, that the French miniſters had received no inſtructions from their government to join our applications reſpecting the completion of the guaranty *. Were *we* then anſwerable for obſtacles which were occaſioned by the deliberate neglect, or the artful intrigues, of the French cabinet? Were we the cauſe of difficulty or delay?

In conſequence, however, of our perſiſting to retain Malta till the conditions, on which we alone agreed to ſurrender it, were fulfilled, the French government, to ſave appearances, at laſt ordered their miniſters at Berlin and Peterſburgh to apply (their miniſter at Vienna having previouſly applied without orders, and the Emperor having conſented), in conjunction with us; and on the 3d of November following, we find General Hedouville, who was the French miniſter at the court of Peterſburgh, ſtating in the preſence of Sir J. B. Warren, the Britiſh miniſter, to the Chancellor of Ruſſia, "that without the guaranty of Ruſſia, either of the two powers (meaning England and France), upon the firſt

* See the Correſpondence.

difference between them, would look upon themſelves at liberty to ſeize the iſland *." Here then, at leaſt, was *his* opinion of the importance of a guaranty, and particularly of the acceſſion of Ruſſia.

The firſt formal requiſition reſpecting Malta, which was made to the Britiſh cabinet, was on the 25th of January 1803. On that day we find the craſty Talleyrand, who was not yet acquainted with the conditional conſent of the Emperor of Ruſſia, acknowledging to Lord Whitworth, that, generally ſpeaking, the acceſſion of the guarantees was neceſſary; but obſerving (Auſtria having conſented, Pruſſia being at his command †, and entertaining ſome doubts about Ruſſia) that the guaranty would be equally complete *without*

* Correſpondence, No. 33.

† In Auguſt 1802, when Mr. Bignon, the French miniſter at Berlin, was applied to at different times by Mr. Caſamajor, on the ſubject of Malta, "he conſtantly affected the greateſt indifference, and treated it as a matter of too little importance to occupy the attention of the French government ‡." In November of the ſame year, Count Haugwitz, the principal Pruſſian miniſter of ſtate, was applied to by Mr. Jackſon, on the ſame ſubject. He ſaid that Pruſſia "took a very ſlight intereſt in the fate of the iſland, and that ſhe was countenanced in withholding her guaranty by the *example of Spain* §." Here is a ſingular coincidence of ſentiment, between the French and Pruſſian miniſters, and a pretty ſtrong circumſtantial proof, that they were both inſtructed by France how to act.

‡ *Correſpondence, No.* 28. § *No.* 31.

Ruſſia †; admitting alſo that we had ſome pretext to keep Malta, but that it would be ſpeedily removed ‡. So late, therefore, as the 25th of January 1803, within a few days of ten months after the ſignature of the definitive treaty, we obſerve the wary Talleyrand differing entirely from the opinion of our author, and allowing that we had a juſtifiable pretext, which *would be ſoon removed.* Could then, in the name of candour and juſtice, up to this period at leaſt, any blame poſſibly attach to us? Five days after Talleyrand's declaration, viz. on the 30th of January, Sebaſtiani's Report was publiſhed.

About this time the proviſional acceſſion of the Emperor of Ruſſia, which had been ſigned at Peterſburgh on the 24th of November 1802, reached London. It was unfortunately ſuch as we could not conſent to, as its main purport was to aboliſh the Malteſe langue, and to diſfranchiſe the native inhabitants of the iſland of all thoſe peculiar privileges with which we had ſtipulated that they ſhould be inveſted. But whilſt we lamented this circumſtance, we teſtified every diſpoſition to come to ſome qualified arrangement, which might

† Here was a wide difference of opinion between Talleyrand and Hedouville.

‡ Correſpondence, No. 35.

bring the diſpute to an amicable adjuſtment, and, at the ſame time, ſecure the Malteſe, whom we in honour were bound to protect, in the enjoyment of their rights †. Nothing, however, can diſarm the reſentment of our author, who, ever ready to ſtand forward as the champion of France, in his fatal zeal to ſerve her, is thrown into a heap of inconſiſtencies, among which he totally loſes himſelf. One moment he reproaches us for abandoning the Malteſe, the next for advocating their cauſe; and after abuſing us (though not in terms, yet in fact) for inſiſting on the obſervance of the *letter* of the treaty, he accuſes us of flying from the letter, and wiſhing to abide by our interpretation of the *ſpirit* *.

No ſooner did the French government perceive our readineſs to enter into a new arrangement reſpecting Malta (which had been indicated even before the ſentiments of the Emperor of Ruſſia were known), and to renounce thoſe advantages which the unforeſeen impracticability of the contract had fairly placed in our hands, than they conſtrued this relaxation into a diſpoſition to abdicate every thing rather than renew hoſtilities. Stimulated by ſuch conjectures, they imagined that

† Correſpondence, No. 2, of papers ordered to be printed on 26th May.

* Page 20.

they could eaſily terrify us into any terms of ſubmiſſion; and in this perſuaſion, partly by way of bravado, and partly to expoſe and humiliate us in the eyes of the world, they thought fit to publiſh Sebaſtiani's Report, wherein they inſolently diſplayed the ſcope of their views, and boldly avowed the plans they purpoſed adopting to enſure their accompliſhment *.

Although this Report, like every other outrage or aggreſſion on the part of France, is treated by our author with the greateſt levity, it was, fortunately for this country, contemplated by the Government with a more appropriate feeling. The French had now hazarded a ſtep too far,

* General Andreoſſi, in his official note preſented on the 29th of March 1803, mentions Sebaſtiani's Report as an anſwer to Sir Robert Wilſon's publication. He ſays, "It was at once a refutation and a reparation, which the French army had a right to expect†." Now if this had been one of the occaſions of the Report, being merely an hiſtorical anecdote related by a *private individual* (and, like the relation of every other tranſaction, neceſſary to the character of his work), it ſtill could be no juſtification of the conduct of the *government* of France. But even the fact, defective as it is, will not bear out the aſſertion. Sebaſtiani ſailed from Toulon on the 16th of September, and Sir Robert Wilſon's work did not appear till the November following; ſo that the inſtructions of the French emiſſary could not poſſibly be the conſequence of the publication of the Engliſh Colonel.

† *Correſpondence, No.* 49.

which at once opened our eyes, awakened us to our danger, and put a period to conceſſion. Many of the lies which the Report contains were ſo palpable, that the internal evidence of their falſehood was inſtantly diſcernible. The unqualified publication of them by the government of France was, therefore, an aggravation of the affront. It was adding the provocation of contempt to the indelicacy of abuſe. The critical moment at which it appeared, whilſt matters of no ſmall moment were pending, was an additional proof of their determination to preſerve no friendſhip with us, but, on the contrary, to haraſs and inſult us in a manner that ſhould convince the world that we had no longer the fortitude to reſiſt, and that an attack was all that was neceſſary to ſubdue us. This Report ſtopped at once all further proceedings, and ſo reverſed the viſible poſition of circumſtances, that we now declared a reſolution not to evacuate Malta, until an adequate ſecurity was placed in our hands. Was this more than common ſenſe ſuggeſted, or common diſcretion required? or were we ſtill to go on, ſubmitting to provocations, enduring reproaches, and acquieſcing in encroachment, till not only Malta but England was at the diſpoſal of France? If the public concerns of the nation had been intruſted to the management of our author, we ſhould in all probability

have ſhortly had to deplore ſuch an humiliation. Our author, who takes ſuch a charitable view of this ſcandalous official production, and regards it in ſo venial, and even ſo jocular a light, aſks, "What does this curious paper ſay * ?" *Curious* I admit it is: what it *ſays* is palpable to the intellect of every one who reads it. It is ſufficiently inſulting to excite reſentment; it is ſufficiently intelligible to awaken ſuſpicion; it is ſufficiently declaratory to require explanation.

Things began now to wear a ſerious complexion. France had indiſcreetly promulgated her intentions. She had plainly demonſtrated that her ultimate object was war, but that her previous deſign was to tarniſh our fame, to enfeeble us by negotiation, and to ſtir up a ſpirit of implacable vengeance among her people, by endeavouring to perſuade them that we were the aggreſſors, the violators of public faith, the oppreſſors of defenceleſs ſtates, and an impetuous, ambitious, and perfidious race, with whom it was utterly impoſſible to live on terms of amity and good-will. This, indeed, was the evident policy of France. She had objects of moment to accompliſh before war could be declared with advantage. The departure of the expedition from Helvoetſluys, the termination of the troubles

* Page 21.

in her colonies, the return of her Weſt India fleet: theſe were all matters of importance. Nor was ſhe, in other reſpects, in a ſtate of competent preparation. She had not yet ſufficiently recovered from the ſevere ſhocks which ſhe had ſuſtained in the courſe of the laſt war. She had alſo the re-eſtabliſhment of her manufactures, the revival of her commerce, and the reſtoration of her navy, very much at heart. Thus, although ſhe had afforded poſitive indications of her intention to renew hoſtilities, it was nearly as clear that her deſign was to wait till ſhe had matured thoſe manifold arrangements which would enſure the likelihood of waging them with ſucceſs: and it was only her miſtaken notion of our faculties and courage, acted upon by her ungovernable deſire of revenge, that betrayed her into an error which ſhe may long have occaſion to mourn.

When, however, ſhe found that we were ſo ſenſitive; that we were not ſo completely ſunk in lethargy; that we had ſome ſenſe of honour, and ſome energy of action, left; that, although we were diſpoſed to bear a good deal, there was a point beyond which we might be provoked to reſiſtance: when ſhe diſcovered all this, ſhe, at the ſame moment, diſcovered the folly of her conduct. She then perceived that ſhe had taken an injudicious and precipitate ſtep; that ſhe had

prematurely diſcloſed her plans; and that an immediate war might involve her in difficulties from which ſhe would not eaſily extricate herſelf. Theſe, and theſe alone, were her reaſons for wiſhing to temporize, to amuſe us by promiſes, and to delay for a few months the ſingle-handed experiment. But it was now too late: the Rubicon was paſſed. We now ſaw into her real character; and goaded and wearied out as we had been by the unworthy ſituation in which we had ſo long been mocked, we became impatient, and peremptory in our turn. The French refuſing to comply, and ſtill aiming to gain time by a repetition of the tricks by which they had already deluded us, a period was at laſt put to negotiation, and war commenced.

If this country had been influenced by the councils, and guided by the accommodating politics, of our author, we might, I grant, have remained a little longer at peace; becauſe we ſhould have continued yielding till we had nothing left to yield, rather than have taken up arms in vindication of our rights. The French might have ſeized the whole of the continent—*that*, in our author's opinion, did not concern *us!* they might have gained poſſeſſion of Malta, and of all the iſlands in the Adriatic, the Archipelago, and the Mediterranean—*they* were not worth contending for!—they might

have conquered Egypt, and have added it indiſſolubly to their European empire—our fears, reſpecting any injury which might ariſe from that quarter to our Indian poſſeſſions, were perfectly prepoſterous! In ſhort, had we followed our author's judgment, we might have waited till the power of France became ſo gigantic and ſo conſolidated, ſo rich in reſources, ſo abundant in means, ſo provided on every ſide with weapons of defence and attack, that the political exiſtence of this country would have depended on her charity. Lying thus at her mercy, we ſhould have been the abject ſlaves of her meaneſt paſſions, and the humble ſuitors for any benefits which her deſpotic will condeſcended to grant. We ſhould have been at the diſpoſal of a tyrant whoſe moſt fervent and moſt conſtant wiſh is our deſtruction; and who, in every thing that regarded *us*, in obedience to the governing impulſe of his nature, would have conſulted his vengeance in preference to his intereſt.

Now it had been, till of late years, the uniform policy of all the leading powers of Europe, throughout their hiſtory, at leaſt ever ſince their civilization, to adhere pretty ſteadily to a certain principle of action, which had in view the preſervation of a political balance. This wiſe conduct, whilſt it was conſiſtent with the general good, tended alſo to their own individual ſecurity

and happineſs. Thus, when any particular ſtate was aiming at an augmentation of ſtrength which was likely to endanger the independence or diſturb the tranquillity of the reſt, confederacies were immediately formed to terminate its encroachment and circumſcribe its ambition. The deſire of ſelf-preſervation is the ſtrongeſt impulſe of humanity. It operates on communities as well as individuals, and is equally acknowledged by the maxims of morality and the precepts of religion. An impulſe, ſo authorized and ſo univerſal, cannot poſſibly be at variance with any conſtitution of things that is founded in juſtice or nature; and if we could ſuppoſe any conventional law that attempted to contravene ſo poſitive and indiſputable a right, we ſhould be at no loſs to decide which ought to preponderate. But the practice of mankind has ſeldom called this right in queſtion; and it has ever been allowed by the moſt enlightened ſtateſmen, the moſt learned juriſts, and even the moſt romantic metaphyſicians, that the mere circumſtance of a nation rapidly becoming more powerful than any of its neighbours, is not only a cauſe of remonſtrance, but, if that be diſregarded, a juſtification of attack. It is, indeed, the uniform operation of theſe general principles which has been the chief means of preſerving, through ſo many centuries, the ſame diviſion of Europe.

To maintain, therefore, that France *has the right* to trample down all theſe fences, and ſet at contemptuous defiance all theſe eſtabliſhed rules, ſanctioned as they have been by the wiſdom and conſent of ages, merely becauſe it is *her will and pleaſure ſo to do*; and that, whilſt ſhe is ſwallowing up the weaker ſtates, domineering over extenſive territories, transferring people, like cattle, from one maſter to another, without conſulting their prejudices or intereſts, and almoſt reverſing the order of nature: whilſt ſhe is, moreover, evidently committing theſe flagitious acts of violence, as a preparatory ſtep to a more ſucceſsful attack on the general liberties of the human race, to maintain that *we*, a near neighbour and an eternal rival, *have no right* to interfere, is aſſuming a doctrine which is not only reſiſted by every motive of diſcretion and ſelf-defence, but which is in direct contradiction to the acknowledged maxims either of natural, conventional, or public law, and to the common practice and experience of mankind. As, therefore, by oppoſing this novel ſyſtem there is no breach of morality, no infringement of privilege, no deviation from cuſtom, or no violation of nature, there can be no reaſon of policy which ought to ſuperinduce our departure from what, abſtractedly conſidered, is a ſelf-evident axiom,

and, relatively conſidered, is a moſt ſacred and eſſential duty.

Our author expreſſes his ſurpriſe that we ſhould entertain ſo ſtrong a conception of the immediate deſigns of the Firſt Conſul upon Egypt, "though he repeatedly avers he has none*." But though he diſavowed *immediate* deſigns, did he not declare to Lord Whitworth that he had *deſigns*—that, *ſooner or later*, Egypt would belong to France, and that Sebaſtiani's miſſion was not merely a *commercial* one, as Talleyrand had repreſented it, but a *military* one†? What then were we to underſtand from the general tenour of his converſation? What, but that the poſſeſſion of Egypt was one of his darling objects, and that he would gratify himſelf the moment he could accompliſh

* Page 22.

† Correſpondence, No. 38.—We find, more than once, in the courſe of the Correſpondence, the maſter and the miniſter at variance in their profeſſions, and the impetuous temper of Buonaparte deſtroying the crafty deſigns of Talleyrand. Buonaparte is alſo full of duplicity; but he is more impatient of control, and more eaſily thrown off his guard. When, however, he inadvertently betrays his real ſentiments, he only confirms our opinion of the profligacy of his character. None of the remaining independent continental powers (if ſuch they can ſtill be called) will, I hope, forget his propoſal to form a junction with us, and, with the aſſiſtance and co-operation of his army and our fleet, to divide the ſpoils of the world.

it with ſafety? Even Talleyrand admitted, "that the acquiſition of Egypt had been, and perhaps *ſtill was*, a favourite object of the Firſt Conſul*;"—"that the jealouſy we felt on the ſcore of Egypt, with a view to our poſſeſſions in India, was natural†;" and although our author can perceive no foundation for ſuch a feeling, I think, of the two opinions, that of the French miniſter, eſpecially as it was an admiſſion to his own prejudice, is entitled to the greateſt deference.

Our author next finds fault with the final propoſal, and, quite regardleſs of circumſtances or facts, reprobates our conduct in the ſevereſt terms. "The French," he ſays, "aſk in amazement, Is there an example in the records of hiſtory, of ſo imperious an ultimatum‡?" To this queſtion I ſhall merely refer *them* to their *own records* for an anſwer. But *our author* paſſes the ſame judgment, and, with affected candour, adds, "Let us caſt away prejudice and partiality, and

* Correſpondence, No. 40.

† No. 37.—What did Talleyrand's propoſed project, by which the integrity of the Turkiſh empire was to be *effectually* ſecured, turn out to be? Why, forſooth, that the French Ambaſſador at Conſtantinople had been "charged to give every aſſurance of the diſpoſition of France to ſtrengthen, inſtead of to weaken, that government." This was a pretty kind of *ſubſtantial ſecurity*, and *very ſatisfactory*.—Correſpondence, No. 40.

‡ Page 23.

aſk, was it *not* a moſt imperious ultimatum?" As for our author's *prejudice and partiality*, I can diſcover none that he has to caſt away, except what is in favour of the French; and of that kind, I own, I can diſcover a conſiderable quantity. But *my* anſwer to the queſtion is, that, ſo far from thinking the ultimatum a *moſt imperious one*, I think it, conſidering what had paſſed, *a moſt mild one*; and this I ſhall alſo prove.

In conſequence of the numerous aggreſſions of France, which, according to the acknowledged baſis on which the definitive treaty was eſtabliſhed, entitled us to compenſation; in conſequence of ſtill further views declared, in ſeveral official documents, by the government of France; and in conſequence of the total impracticability of fulfilling the arrangement relative to the ceſſion of Malta; we, in order to bring to an amicable ſettlement theſe complicated ſubjects of diſpute, and to ſet our minds at reſt reſpecting the future deſigns of France on Egypt, propoſed that Malta ſhould remain ours in perpetuity; and that Holland and Switzerland ſhould be evacuated by French troops. In return, we offered to confirm to France the poſſeſſion of the iſland of Elba, and to acknowledge the King of Etruria, and the Italian and Ligurian republics*. This was ſurely moderate enough, when

* Correſpondence, No. 50.

regarded as a ſatisfaction and a counterpoiſe for the immenſe continental acquiſitions of France; a right founded on formal agreement, and which Talleyrand, even in diſcuſſing this very point, had willingly admitted †. This propoſal was made on the 7th of April 1803, at Paris. On the 13th, Rheinhardt's libel in the Hamburgh Gazette was known in London, with all the circumſtances attending that ſcandalous publication ‡. On the ſame day, however, notwithſtanding this freſh provocation, finding that the French had declared, that their objection to our perpetual retention of Malta was inſuperable, Lord Hawkeſbury inſtructed Lord Whitworth, if he found their reluctance to the firſt propoſition could not be overcome, to offer two others, ſhould circumſtances render it adviſable, as modifications. By the firſt of theſe it is ſtipulated, that, inſtead of complete ſovereignty, the civil government of the iſland ſhall be given to the Order of St. John, but that the fortifications ſhall be occupied in perpetuity by his Majeſty's troops; by the ſecond, that the iſland ſhall remain in our poſſeſſion for a limited number of years ||. Was not this ſufficiently temperate, and did it not plainly demonſtrate a ſincere deſire, on the part of the Britiſh government, to

† Correſpondence, No. 53. ‡ No. 55. || No. 56.

bring the buſineſs to a ſpeedy and conciliatory iſſue?

On the 17th of April, Lord Whitworth had an interview with Joſeph Buonaparte, when, the firſt propoſition having been abſolutely rejected, he ſubmitted the ſecond to his conſideration. This was alſo objected to, and regarded as an inſurmountable impediment. The laſt propoſition, however, which Lord Whitworth had received orders to produce, as occaſion might require, was foreſtalled by Buonaparte's brother, who ſaid, "that he was not without hope that he might be authorized to propoſe the occupation of the fortreſſes for a term of years*." Talleyrand alſo, the ſame morning, ſuggeſted to Lord Whitworth the ſame mode of coming to an arrangement†. It thus appears, that the principal clauſe of this ultimatum, which our author affirms is ſo outrageouſly arrogant, originated with the French government; and that, after concert and deliberation, the identical propoſition, in the identical language, came from two of the Firſt Conſul's moſt confidential adviſers. Here then were ſtrong grounds of hope that an adjuſtment would ſhortly take place. The following evening Lord Whitworth again ſaw Joſeph Buonaparte, who aſſured him "that he ſhould hear from Talleyrand in the courſe of the

* Correſpondence, No. 58. † Ibid.

next morning, and that a meeting would be appointed, in order to ſettle the *term of years* for which the Firſt Conſul might be induced to conſent to the ceſſion of Malta*." Talleyrand, however, never came; and on the 20th, no further notice having been taken of the appointment, not even a line of apology ſent, Lord Whitworth wrote to his Court for freſh orders †. Three days were ſuffered to elapſe in this mortifying and embarraſſing ſtate of ſuſpenſe, when our Ambaſſador, hearing nothing more on the ſubject, on the 21ſt called on Talleyrand, who *ſtill* encouraged the idea of an arrangement on the baſis of a temporary poſſeſſion ‡. As there had now been ample time for conſultation in the French cabinet, things apparently bore a very promiſing aſpect; but on ſeeing Talleyrand the very next day, Lord Whitworth was, to his utter aſtoniſhment, informed, "that the Firſt Conſul would, on no terms, hear either of a perpetual or a *temporary* poſſeſſion of Malta ‖." So that the moment they perceived we yielded one point, they puſhed us to another. When we were perſuaded to abandon *that*, they themſelves propoſed a third, which when we conſented to, they abruptly put an end to the queſtion, by telling us that we muſt give up every thing. The ulti-

* Correſpondence, No. 59. † Ibid. ‡ No. 61. ‖ Ibid.

matum ſent by our Court was the conſequence of this ſhuffling perfidy, in which, inſtead of riſing in our demands, we ſtrictly adhered to the very propoſition which had been ſtarted by the French government; and even, in order to ſave the honour of France, at which our author is ſo indignant, we made an additional conceſſion, and propoſed the ſecret article *. Several other puerile contrivances were afterwards reſorted to by the French cabinet to renew the negotiation on a different ground, which were evidently only intended to gain time. We demanded a categorical anſwer: none was returned: Lord Whitworth conſequently left Paris, and the following week the war commenced †.

Hoſtilities, which I have proved we were, throughout the negotiation, ſo ſtudious to avoid, being thus decreed, our peaceable and patriotic

* Correſpondence, No. 70.

† It ſhould be recollected, that Talleyrand had, ſo far back as the 11th of March 1803, declared to Lord Whitworth in expreſs terms, that the Firſt Conſul *ſhould always conſider the refuſal to evacuate Malta as a commencement of hoſtilities*; that he at the time delivered a moſt offenſive and outrageous note §; that the French government had, by every poſſible inſult, provoked us to the meaſure; and that, even after it was delivered, Lord Whitworth ſtill ſhewed a deſire of explanation, till he was abſolutely forced to his departure by the ſhuffling perfidy and contemptuous treatment of the French miniſters.

§ *Correſpondence, No.* 42.

author expreſſes a hope that they may be abridged by the friendly interpoſition of Ruſſia. I alſo wiſh, and moſt ardently too, that the war may be a ſhort one; but I fancy we ſhould differ materially in our manner of bringing it to a concluſion. Now, with regard to the interference of Ruſſia, or indeed of any other continental power, after what has happened we cannot ſurely be too wary in liſtening to any overtures which may come from ſo ſuſpicious a quarter. After the manner in which theſe ſtates have betrayed and deſerted their own intereſts—after the mutual fears and jealouſies which have been manifeſted, and which have operated as an hindrance towards any common effort for their common ſalvation—after the puſillanimous ſubmiſſion, whether friendſhip or fear be pleaded, it matters not, which they have uniformly diſplayed towards France—after the little regard they have ſhewn for public faith, and the indifferent facility with which they have evaded or cancelled the moſt ſolemn and deliberate acts, the policy of this country is too obvious to be miſtaken.

We have unhappily diſcovered, that ſuch is the profligate wickedneſs of the political creed of the French government, that a written engagement, accompanied with every ſanctified and ceremonious formality, is worth no more than the parchment on which it is engroſſed. We

muſt therefore look to other ſecurities, and, ſince we have been again compelled to reſort to arms by the inſatiable ambition and abandoned perfidy of the preſent uſurper of France, I truſt that the Government of this country will give ear to no terms, from whatever quarter they may come, unleſs they be ſuch as will, to a *certainty*, prevent at leaſt a *ſpeedy* recurrence of the miſeries of war. With or without the mediation of other powers (for we are neither bound by gratitude, nor conſtrained by neceſſity, to look up to them), we ſhall, I truſt, take care to retain in our own keeping ſuch ſecurities as will, to a moral certainty, obviate a repetition of paſt mortifications, and command a fair proſpect of honourable and undiſturbed repoſe.

Our author ſays, "If we perſiſt in rejecting all conciliatory projects from Ruſſia, who has marked a diſapproval of our conduct, what muſt Europe think of us? How will the Dutch feel the ſituation we have brought them into? the Swiſs, the Romans, the Neapolitans *?" And pray, under what particular obligations are we to theſe enchained and unhappy countries? We may wiſh, as we certainly do, from policy, as well as humanity, to reſcue them from the cruel ſcourge of French domination; but ſurely we

* Page 24.

may be allowed to act without conſulting them, nor is it at all requiſite that our conduct ſhould quadrate with theirs. What will the different countries of Europe think of *us?* Why, in ſpite of their envy or their hatred, they muſt think, that we are a great and magnanimous people, worthy of the rights we enjoy, and, I had almoſt ſaid, of the pre-eminent bleſſings by which the bounty of Providence has diſtinguiſhed us. But let them chiefly think of *themſelves,* and not be perplexed about us, except in the view of contraſting *our* conduct with *theirs,* and of profiting by our glorious example. Let them think, that the very names of many of them are blotted from the map of Europe. Let them think of their former greatneſs, independence, proſperity, and happineſs, and of their preſent grovelling ſlavery. Let them think, that if they had but done as much for themſelves as we have done for them, they might have eſcaped the indiſcriminate plunder of avarice, the deſolating cruelty of revenge, and the galling deſpotiſm of a foreign yoke: and let ſuch thoughts ſtimulate them to exertions which may yet redeem them from the miſery and ignominy under which they have long been languiſhing.

Our author next attempts to prove that Malta is of very little conſequence, though he admits the probability of the French having taken

poſſeſſion of it, had it been evacuated by our troops. Egypt he regards nearly in the ſame light, though he alſo admits, that it would, perhaps, have become a French colony if we had not interfered. But if the French conſidered them of ſuch importance, as to run the riſk of going to war for their attainment, it is at leaſt a proof of *their* opinion of their value. He then enters into a kind of Cretan labyrinth, to explain the difficulty of Buonaparte's getting to India, and, above all, of driving us out; and concludes with this conſolatory remark, that "even granting that he has overcome every obſtacle, and really driven us out of the Indies, ſhall we pay ſo bad a compliment to, think ſo meanly of, our reſources, as to affirm we ſhall even then be ruined and undone*?" I really think we *ſhould be*; for if we had not the courage to go to war for the preſervation of ſuch objects, we ſhould not only, by their loſs, be deprived of an immenſe ſource of proſperity and wealth, but all ſenſe of honour, and all love of glory, would be already extinct; and the moment the French ſummoned our own iſland ſo ſubmit, we ſhould, in all probability, ſurrender it. But not being quite ſo ſpiritleſs and reduced, not being ſo totally loſt to all ſenſe of infamy and ſhame, what

* Page 27.

ſhould we have gained by an immediate compliance with the haughty demands of France relative to the evacuation of Malta? Why this: inſtead of Britiſh troops, French troops would at this moment have had poſſeſſion of that celebrated fortreſs, from which we are daily deriving ſuch ſignal advantages; and the renewal of hoſtilities might have been deferred till that event took place, which, in all likelihood, would have happened in the courſe of a month or ſix weeks, for I cannot bring myſelf to believe (even if Government had had earlier the benefit of our author's advice) that we ſhould have allowed them firſt to make the conqueſt of India, or even of Egypt. But our prudent politician entertains an oppoſite claſs of opinions, and, ſo far from approving of our ſyſtem of oppoſing Buonaparte in his ſchemes, ſays, "Should he perſiſt in his wild plans reſpecting Egypt, it would be the worſt policy this country could adopt to obſtruct them *." I really wonder he did not go a little farther, and recommend our government lending him a Britiſh army, to enable him more firmly to eſtabliſh his ſway.

Our author, whom I have now traced, and I think I may venture to ſay, confuted, through all his moſt important paſſages, ſtarted with a

* Page 28.

ſet of erroneous notions, to which he has, throughout his tract, adhered with the moſt unconquerable pertinacity. But his premiſes being falſe, even admitting that, in ſome few inſtances (for I will not grant him many), his reaſoning is juſt, his concluſions muſt ſtill bear the counterfeit ſtamp of the materials from which they have been derived. He ſays we have broken our faith reſpecting Malta. I ſay *we have not*. Here we are completely at iſſue: but, unfortunately for him, he has only the whimſies of his own brain to refer to; whereas I am ſupported by the incontrovertible evidence of facts, and the treaty.

At this time, it would be uſeleſs to go at any greater length into the queſtion. Every body has read the Correſpondence, and, ſetting apart a few wrong-headed, and I may add *wrong-hearted*, individuals, whom no conviction can reclaim, I have with me, not only reſpecting the policy, but the *abſolute neceſſity*, of the preſent war, an united nation. It is not an intricate problem, wrapped up in myſtery and doubt, requiring any peculiar ſubtlety of reaſon to unravel, or any peculiar force of comprehenſion to underſtand; but it is a plain and palpable propoſition, open to general obſervation, and to the conception of which the moſt obtuſe, as well as the moſt enlightened, mind is equally com-

petent. This being the caſe, and not only general, but, with a very few exceptions, univerſal opinion running in the ſame channel, one may ſurely, without arrogance, pronounce him to be wrong (whatever his own notions of his ſuperior judgment and penetration may be), who puts in his diſſentient voice.

There is one important charge contained in the Declaration, which our author (conſidering it, no doubt, as unworthy of remark) has entirely overlooked. I allude to the outrageous indignity offered perſonally by Buonaparte, at his own court, in the preſence of the foreign miniſters and two hundred people, to the Britiſh Ambaſſador, who had come, as a mark of civility, to pay him his reſpects. This was the opportunity which the upſtart Firſt Conſul ſelected, groſſly to inſult the repreſentative of one of the firſt crowned heads in Europe, and to accuſe the Britiſh government of a breach of faith. "*Ils ne reſpectent pas les traités. Il faut dorénavant les couvrir de crepe noir. Malheur à ceux qui ne reſpectent pas les traités**." Such were the phraſes which he uttered, adding menace to reproof. If ſuch a charge, in ſuch language, could, under any circumſtances, be juſtified, no one can pretend to defend or extenuate it as it ſtands; and

* Correſpondence, No. 43.

it is, incontrovertibly, the moſt indecent dereliction of all ceremony and decorum that is on record. And what was his apology? An aſſurance that nothing ſimilar ſhould again occur *. Was this ſatisfaction for ſuch an outrage? To draw an illuſtration from private life, it might as well be maintained, that if one man pull another by the noſe, and promiſe never to do it again, he has made every reparation which the laws of honour require. What was it then but an aggravation of the inſult?

Our author, as if ſenſible that the opinions he has ſupported, and the doctrines he has broached, are ſuch as are not unlikely to create ſome irritation in the feelings of his countrymen, towards the concluſion, teſtifies a little compunction, and, in order to make ſome atonement, and to prevail on his readers to lay him aſide with leſs ill-humour and diſguſt, to our great ſurpriſe informs us, that "his opinion of the Chief Conſul differs but little from that of the generality of mankind; that he feels equally with others, the injuſtice of his uſurpation, and the rigour of his deſpotiſm; and if what he is accuſed of is true, of which he fears there is hardly a doubt, there are few epithets that can be beſtowed upon him fouler than he deſerves †." And, to prove

* Correſpondence, No. 46. † Page 29.

that he ſhould rejoice if he had paid the forfeit of his crimes, for the benefit of ſcholars, he favours us with a Greek quotation.

His concluſion is ſtill more extraordinary. After having exerted, through the courſe of *twenty-nine* cloſely-printed pages, all his ingenuity to perſuade the country that the government has been violent, haſty, treacherous, and, in every inſtance, completely in the wrong, he reſerves *one* to tell us that he wiſhes them ſucceſs. After having ſtrenuouſly endeavoured to render them culpable in the eyes of the nation for having gone to war, and, as far as indifference or oppoſition could be ſtirred up by the diffuſion of ſuch ſentiments, to throw every impediment in their way, he ſays, "Far be it from me to impede the chance of that deſirable event, a reaſonable peace, by diſturbing the operations of Government, or checking the energies of the country *." Fortunately *that* is beyond the reach of his ability: but I will put the queſtion flatly to him, by what means could he have more artfully or more induſtriouſly ſtriven to accompliſh miſchief, and diſſeminate diſcontent, than by thoſe he has purſued in his work? With this obſervation I ſhall diſmiſs him, and, after two or three additional remarks, ſhall quit a ſub-

* Page 29.

ject which has been, in various ways, ſo amply diſcuſſed, and which is ſo generally underſtood.

I have no ſcruple in ſaying, that I regard the preſent war (and I know that I am joined by the almoſt unanimous opinion of my country) as a war into which (after every teſtimony of ſincerity and moderation to which it was poſſible for an independent government to ſtoop) we have been abſolutely forced, by the ſhameleſs aggreſſion, intolerable inſolence, abandoned perfidy, and wicked ambition, of the tyrant of France; as a war not only neceſſary to our proſperity, our honour, and our defence, but to our very ſalvation and exiſtence; and which, ſo far from being a ſubject of reprobation or regret, is the only event that could ſnatch us from bondage and perdition. Buonaparte, if he had acted with common caution, ſuch was, for a long time, our unſuſpicious flexibility, might have enſnared us; but the impetuoſity of his paſſions, the irritability of his temper, the abſurdity of his vanity, and the madneſs of his ambition, prevailed over all political prudence, and diſcloſed his views before they were ripe for execution. His character is now completely revealed. It is before the world, ſtripped of the load of tinſel which ſkreened it from the eyes of the common obſerver, and is expoſed, in its genuine colours, to the contemplation of the multitude. Diveſted of the gaudy

trappings with which ſucceſs had decorated it, it is now an object of univerſal abhorrence and execration. The public ſpirit of this country has alſo taken deep root. Loyalty and patriotiſm have ariſen, and pervade the great body of the people, who are convinced of the neceſſity of cordially uniting in defence of their common rights, to ſave their common country from becoming a prey to perhaps the worſt man that fortune ever raiſed from obſcurity to extended rule. His ill-judged rupture with this land of freemen will probably curtail his deſolating career; and, obedient as we are to the exhortations of duty, we may confidently look forward to a proſperous, and, if things are conducted with vigour and ſkill, to a ſpeedy, termination of the conflict.

(5.)

A

REJOINDER

TO THE

REPLY

OF THE AUTHOR OF

"WHY DO WE GO TO WAR?"

The garbling of quotations is the greateſt offence, of which an author can be guilty, either to his adverſary, or to his readers.

MARSH's *Rejoinder to the anonymous Author of the Remarks on Michaelis and his Commentator.*

ADVERTISEMENT.

In the ſecond edition of my pamphlet, in conſequence of the additions I have made, I have been obliged to alter the numeration of the pages. To ſave trouble, and prevent confuſion, I have, however, in the paſſages I have noticed, marked, among the references, the pages in which they are to be found, both in the firſt and ſecond editions.

For the Reply to which this is a Rejoinder see infra

A

REJOINDER,

&c.

I AM ſorry that the author of the ſix monoſyllables, "Why do we go to War?" appears to be ſo exaſperated at a few ſuſpicions which I threw out in the *firſt* edition of my Anſwer to his work, and I lament it the more, as I fear that the irritation which he has betrayed muſt continue; for, in ſpite of his angry tones, I have neither cancelled nor retracted them in the *ſecond*. As far as my own judgment enables me to decide, they are founded on inferences which are clearly and fairly deducible from his manner of treating his ſubject, and, of courſe, are ſuch as I ſtand completely juſtified in uſing.

Notwithſtanding the palpable perfidy, extravagant ambition, and overbearing inſolence of

France, and the ſincerity and cautious moderation, not to ſay *humility*, of the Britiſh cabinet, which are ſtrikingly apparent in almoſt every page of the Official Correſpondence, the author of the Gallican pamphlet has thought proper to endeavour, in *every inſtance*, to exculpate France at the expenſe of Britain, and to throw the odium and guilt of the preſent war *entirely* on his own country. This, I ſay, he has *attempted* to do; and if, in *every inſtance*, he have *totally* failed, it has not been from ſlackneſs of zeal. I have only combated and refuted his opinions and miſrepreſentations, on a queſtion of the higheſt importance to every member of the Britiſh community; and, if I have any where expreſſed myſelf in a manner at all ungracious to his feelings, I am ſure that the ſentiments which he has uttered have fully authorized me ſo to do *. He has thrown out abuſe, and, what

* When a political writer embraces an opinion which is injurious to his country, and, profeſſing to found that opinion on public official documents, in order to give a ſpecioufneſs to his labours, diſplays that kind of patient examination and keen reſearch, which are requiſite to enable him to ſelect from a large maſs of papers, thoſe paſſages which are *moſt favourble*, and to reject thoſe which are *moſt adverſe* to his deſign; it cannot well be imputed to want of deliberation, or even to excuſable fallibility, if he determine wrong. Why, in the inſtance before us, have ſo many unconnected and incongruous paſſages been forced together, whilſt intermediate ones, which are ten times

is more miſchievous, abuſe unſupported by fact, not only againſt the government, but againſt the *people* of this country; and few, I fancy, have peruſed his work, without emotions either of indignation or contempt. In what manner could he more plainly have deſignated his enmity to Britain, eſpecially at a moment like this, when

more material to the elucidation of the queſtion, have been perverted from their meaning, or totally ſuppreſſed? Why has not a fair and candid inquiry been inſtituted? Why has not the argument been logically ſtated, and ſome attention beſtowed on the conſtruction and adaptation of analogous parts? Why has it not been reviewed in all its bearings and relations, and thoſe deductions extracted, which are the natural reſult? This is certainly the duty of every author, the object of whoſe inquiries is *truth*; and he who *willingly* deviates from it, is not only guilty of *garbling and miſrepreſentation*, but lays himſelf open to the charge of having ſtated a concluſion, for ſome factious purpoſe, againſt his own conviction. Far be it from me to wiſh to preſcribe bounds to the ſpirit of inveſtigation; and ſo ſacred do I hold the freedom of diſcuſſion, that, of two evils, I would prefer a *licentious* to a *licenſed* preſs. In this land of rational liberty there is, however, a reaſonable latitude allowed by law. Every man, as long as he keeps within the neceſſary rules of common decency, may blame as freely as he may praiſe, and, with equal ſafety, may ſupport or oppoſe the meaſures of Government. Should it ever be otherwiſe, ſhould private ſentiments be ever liable to the controul of the ſtrong arm of executive power; it is my firm opinion, that our liberties would not long ſurvive the reſtraint; for it is on the publicity and variety of individual opinion, that general information, which is one of the great bulwarks of political freedom, chiefly depends.

ſhe is ſtruggling for her exiſtence, and when every well-wiſher to her cauſe is contributing every aid in his power to invigorate the arms, and animate the hearts of her ſons, than by the pains that he has taken to obſcure thoſe documents, which were publiſhed as a guide to national opinion, and which, in truth, afford the moſt irrefragable evidence of the juſtice and neceſſity, on our part, of the preſent war? And for what purpoſe has he done it? To criminate England, and to weaken her ſacred cauſe; and to juſtify the perfidy and uſurpation of revolutionary and atheiſtical France.

Even if our cauſe had been the reverſe of what it is, and weak as it is now ſtrong, I ſhould ſtill think, that, at ſuch a momentous criſis as the preſent, when we are contending for every bleſſing of political independence, of civil liberty, and of domeſtic life, for our religion, our laws, our conſtitution, and our king, nay, for the very air which we breathe, and the ſoil which nouriſhes us; againſt the moſt unprincipled, relentleſs, and perilous foe, that ever appeared againſt us; no prudent or *good* citizen would ſtrive to weaken it ſtill more, by the promulgation of opinions, ſuch as he has ſo pompouſly detailed. I have, at leaſt ever ſince I have thought for myſelf, been in the habit of regarding my country as a kind of protector, a faithful

friend, an affectionate parent, to feel all her wrongs, to ſhare all her afflictions, to mourn for her loſſes, to rejoice at her ſucceſſes, and to participate in her proſperity and glory. And if this cloſe connexion, in which I have ever felt ſo much pride and ſatisfaction, would never induce me (as it certainly never would) to make a ſacrifice of truth in her favour; yet, in a dubious caſe, I ſhould, from a natural, and I truſt no diſhonourable partiality, be inclined to lean to her ſide; and, on ſuch a queſtion as the preſent, circumſtanced as we *now* are, if I could not aſſiſt her, I would at leaſt be ſilent.

One of the accuſations which I brought againſt the firſt pamphlet of our author, and which I alleged as my chief reaſon for anwſering it, was, that it had a miſchievous purpoſe *, and might, by falling into the hands of the illiterate, be productive of bad conſequences: and he himſelf ſeems to admit, that if it got into circulation among ignorant people, it might be attended with "injurious effects †." What is this but an acknowledgment of the validity of my imputation? I ſaid that it was calculated to do miſchief among the lower claſſes; he, at leaſt by inference, grants that it might. Thus, ſo far from diſproving the charge,

* Reaſon Why, page 4 in both editions.

† See additional leaf to the ſecond edition of Why do we go to War?

he corroborates it by the additional teſtimony of a voluntary confeſſion. He, however, endeavours to ſhelter himſelf from the chief obloquy of the reproach by ſaying "that it was never addreſſed to the lower orders," but "ſpeaks rather to the magnates of the realm." Now *magnates* * (I know not why he has not explained himſelf in Engliſh), in its literal acceptation, means the *Peers of the realm*, to the excluſion of the Houſe of Commons, the country gentlemen, merchants, bankers, manufacturers, &c.: but, granting that an improper term has been ſelected, I will ſuppoſe, that he intended to include at leaſt the two firſt. Yet why he ſhould imagine that *his* work is ſo peculiarly adapted to the privileged and higher claſſes of the ſtate is ſtill more enigmatical. The paper, the type, the price, the language, is certainly not above plebeian capacity; and as for the ſentiments, it is only among the *lower* claſſes, who have not the nice diſcrimination of men of education, or the leiſure to enter into critical inveſtigation, that there can be any hope of their being received: and as it is generally the ambition

* In Hungary and Poland, where Latin is almoſt a vernacular tongue, this word, which is not of claſſical authority, frequently occurs; but, ſo far from having the general meaning which our author would give it, it is not even extended to the whole body of nobility, but only to the firſt claſs, and to officers of ſtate and of the higheſt public truſt.

of an author to give a currency to his opinions, I ſhould naturally have concluded, if he had not told us the contrary, that it was chiefly deſigned for *them.* Perhaps, however, he left a poſitive injunction with his bookſeller, that if a ſhabby-looking fellow, with a ragged coat, came to aſk for his pamphlet, on no account to let him have it, for *him* it might corrupt; but if a well-dreſſed gentleman, or a faſhionable lady, made the ſame application, to recommend it by all means, and get off as many copies as poſſible; for *them* it muſt edify and inform.

Our author has, at length, publiſhed his promiſed "Reply;" but if he expects a diffuſe rejoinder from me, he will be diſappointed; for although it would not coſt me *much* time or pains to produce one, yet, trifling as they would be, it would be a wanton prodigality and miſapplication of both, which I am not diſpoſed to make. In his original work, I anſwered, and I think, diſproved every poſition which he advanced, as far as concerned the public, and myſelf as a part of that public. As for any altercation, merely for the ſake of diſplaying the powers of abuſe, *that* is totally foreign from my purpoſe: it cannot be very intereſting to the generality of readers, nor ſhall I condeſcend to enter into it. I will, on that ſcore, cheerfully allow to my antagoniſt all the merit which can poſſibly attach

to that kind of ſuperiority. With regard to his preſent publication, to many parts, what I have already ſaid is a ſufficient anſwer: in other parts, he has ſaved me ſome trouble by confuting himſelf: on others again, which are more myſteriouſly wrapped up, but not nearer the truth, it will be neceſſary to offer a few obſervations.

It is very evident, from the pettiſh manner in which he ſets out in his "Reply," that he is exceſſively out of humour with me, becauſe I ſifted, expoſed, and refuted, his original work. Had I advocated the cauſe of France, inſtead of being a *hireling* (which, according to *his* interpretation of the epithet, muſt mean a friend to my country), I ſhould, no doubt, have been a well-bred gentleman, a poliſhed ſcholar, an acute politician, the aſſertor of truth, and the champion of liberty; but, as I am not very anxious about this gentleman's praiſe or cenſure, I would rather remain as I am.

In his encounter with *two* opponents (rather a raſh ſtep for *him* to take), I have the honour (if ſuch it can be accounted) of chiefly attracting his notice, and at me, he levels both his *ſmall* arms and *heavy* artillery; but, although he keeps up a conſtant fire, he expends his ammunition to no purpoſe; for from a want of *weight* in the one, and of *expedition* in the other, he uniformly

miſſes his aim. Really, if every friend to Britain were to fight *for* her cauſe, as miſerably as he argues *againſt* it, we ſhould be in a deplorable ſtate indeed.

A very curſory review of his "Reply," will, I think, be ſufficient to ſilence him; or, if he think proper to ſay any thing further, unleſs he ſhew more ingenuity or more ſenſe, I will promiſe not to moleſt his future repoſe. He manages his new work in a manner which, if we had not ſeen a ſpecimen of his method and perſpicuity in his firſt pamphlet, I might be induced to call *ſtrange*: for he not only goes backwards and forwards with *pages*, as he does in his original work with *dates*, totally regardleſs of arrangement or time, but, having garbled the Correſpondence to anſwer his purpoſe in his firſt performance, he now garbles my anſwer with the ſame deſign; and not only paſſes over, without notice, thoſe parts which are ſtrongeſt againſt him, but, over and over again, ventures to mark with inverted commas as *my words*, what is partly his own fabrication, and in language ſuch as I ſhould feel diſgraced at having written.

After giving me, by way of proving that *he* is a gentleman, a volley of abuſe, he reproaches me* with having taken "above two months"

* Page 3.

to produce my pamphlet, and, to eſtabliſh the veracity of his aſſertion, pretends to have forgotten the date at which his *own* iſſued from the preſs. This is really a convenient kind of memory, and opportunely enough called to his aid. But no wonder he is an enemy to dates. Now, whether I took *two months*, or *two days* (which laſt, by the by, I can aſſure him is very near the mark), to write my anſwer, it is ſo very immaterial to the argument, that I ſhall not employ *two minutes* to convince him one way or the other.

Our author proceeds to what he aptly terms "the weariſome taſk of going over once more the different charges*." If *he* find it *weariſome*, his readers, I fear, will not find it leſs ſo; and as I can diſcover little or no novelty in his opinions, I ſhall not *weary myſelf* by the repetition of ſo dull a purſuit. In two or three paſſages, however, he aſſerts that I have miſtated facts, which is ſo grievous an offence, that I muſt, in my own vindication, notice them, and unmaſk the very handſome mode which has been adopted of ſubſtantiating the charge.

Alluding to the demand which was made by France to diſmiſs the French emigrants, he ſays that I aſſert, "it was *repeatedly* urged by the French, and as *repeatedly* rejected by us†."

* Page 8. † Page 12.

So far he is correct; but, continues he, by way of invalidating my aſſertion, "it ſeems to have been but *once* officially and formally urged," inſinuating that I had employed thoſe terms. Now I ſay nothing about *officially and formally*, I merely ſay *repeatedly urged and repeatedly rejected*, which certainly was the caſe. I will, however, go farther than is neceſſary for my own juſtification, and, if our author will take the trouble of referring to numbers 7 and 12 of the Official Correſpondence, he will find that it was more than *once* even *officially and formally* urged.

The next point our author attacks is the diſcuſſions which took place relative to the liberty of the preſs. He ſays "it is ſtated that" (marking what follows as a quotation) "the French government *repeatedly* urged, that the laws and conſtitution of this country ſhould be changed relative to the liberty of the preſs*;" but, not informing us whence the quotation is extracted, we are left in the dark. To prove, however, his own conſiſtency, and that it was *not* urged more than *once*, he tells us, in the following page, that it was urged a *ſecond* and a *third* time. He omits noticing the complaints of Andreoſſi, which are the *fourth* inſtance that I mention.

But though he ſuppreſſes what Andreoſſi ad-

* Page 13.

vanced relative to the freedom of the preſs, he admits that the French Ambaſſador *did* find fault with "the ſpeeches of ſome leading Members of Parliament." This, however, our author, actuated, no doubt, by a juſt reſpect for the Britiſh conſtitution, conſiders as no "very unreaſonable requeſt*"; ſo that, the grand privilege of freedom of debate, which the Speaker, in the name of the Commons of the United Kingdom, at the opening of every new Parliament, demands of the *King in perſon*, and which no King of England, I hope, will ever venture to refuſe, our author would have controlled by the frivolous complaints of a *French Ambaſſador* †.

He next accuſes me of *ſlinking* from his re-examination ‡. It was, no doubt, very prudent

* Page 15.

† An application of this kind was as ridiculous as it was impertinent. By the nature of our conſtitution, the proceedings of Parliament are publiſhed to the world, and, ſo far from bearing the conſtruction of an act of Government, the ſentiments which are there delivered, are as frequently in oppoſition to it, as in its favour. At all events, they can be no more ſubject to reprehenſion, without the walls of the Houſe, than the diſcuſſions which take place in the Privy Council would be, ſhould any perſon preſent reveal them. Nothing, in fact, can be conſidered as an act of Government, but what paſſes through the uſual organ of communication, or is authenticated by thoſe forms which cuſtom or the conſtitution preſcribes.

‡ Page 20.

in *him* to inſert it, to ſwell out his pamphlet; but, after I had refuted every argument which it contains, why would he have me tire out and diſguſt my readers by a recapitulation of *his* abſurdities?

A little farther on, he returns to his favourite ſubject the preſs. He ſays, "He" (calling him our *enemy*, although he was then our *friend*, at leaſt our *pretended* friend) "ſolicits us, ſince we have ceaſed hoſtilities with the ſword, to ceaſe hoſtilities with the tongue and with the pen; but we refuſe to keep our abuſe even *within bounds*. And tell him (quoting the Reaſon Why), *he may go to law*." Now although I never ſaid that we anſwered him in thoſe identical words, or in that coarſe and abrupt manner, yet we certainly told him ſomething to that effect. And what other method would our author have had us purſue? Would he have put a *Britiſh ſubject*, for ſuch a fault, *out* of the protection of the law? Would he have had a *Britiſh ſubject*, in *defiance* of the law, ſacrificed to the ſplenetic rage or arrogant pretenſions of a *Corſican uſurper?* Would he have had a *Britiſh ſubject* dragged from his bed in the dead of night, and delivered up, gagged and bound, to the *Paris police?* Better at once re-eſtabliſh the Star-chamber, with all its terrific proceedings, in this country! Really this *friend* to the freedom of the preſs

and the liberties of the people maintains his character with a ſuſpicious awkwardneſs.

Our author now proceeds by giving us ſome very curious information. He ſays, "As to the commiſſaries, we *kick* them out of the country." "We further tell him" (meaning our *enemy*, or our *friend*, or M. Otto, or M. Talleyrand, or Andreoſſi, for he does not tell us which), "You have had the impudence to publiſh an impertinent and daring manifeſto, an injurious libel, in the Hamburgh Gazette."—"He replies, I beg pardon, it is really a miſtake; it was not with my conſent, with my knowledge. We tell him he *lies* *, and *attempt* to knock him down. We ſay again, you have had the inſolence to declare we cannot fight you ſingle-handed. Audacious boaſter! we will put it to the teſt, is our reply †." Now where our author obtained this *very* curious intelligence, I own, I am quite at a loſs to conceive; and if he had not informed us, that it paſſed between the repreſentatives of Great Britain and France, I ſhould really have imagined, that it was ſome dialogue which had been over-

* It is but fair to obſerve, that our author does allow in a note, that this particular phraſe of "he lies" was not uſed, but that ſomething *tantamount* paſſed; ſo that we are given to underſtand, that it is only to be conſidered as *his own* elegant mode of expreſſing ſome particular idea.

† Page 17.

heard on a boxing ſtage between two bottle-holders, preparatory to the grand match. But this, I ſuppoſe, is *one* of the parts of his preſent work, which is peculiarly recommended to the attention of the *magnates*, and which *ſublimely ſoars* above the comprehenſion of the *vulgar*.

Reſpecting Malta, after a few general obſervations, he ſays, "I will not fatigue the reader by too minutely following the author of the Reaſon Why *." Fearing to follow me through my analyſis of this important branch of the queſtion, he wiſely evades the conteſt. But he does well, feeling himſelf already completely foiled. He grants, however, a few lines farther on, that the *other clauſes* are obligatory as well as the proviſional one; but, in the ſix following pages, as if he had deſigned to cancel his admiſſion, but had forgotten to ſcratch it out, he attempts to fritter it away into a nonentity.

The next part of our author's "Reply," which I ſhall notice, is page 33, in which he exemplifies a ſignal inſtance of his candour and fairneſs; for he not only quotes my pamphlet incorrectly, but he cautiouſly ſuppreſſes thoſe words of the official document to which I expreſſly allude, and on which he muſt be conſcious that I found my evidence. He ſays, that I boaſt that Talley-

* Page 26.

rand differed from him in opinion, and that he (Talleyrand) "allowed we had a juſtifiable pretext for the retention of Malta up to January 1803." But, adds our author, purſuing his attack, "let us ſee what Lord Whitworth ſays in the very letter referred to by this writer (Official Correſpondence, Number 35)." He then makes an extract from the letter in theſe identical words: "Talleyrand, with *great ſolemnity*, required to be informed, and that by the *expreſs orders* of the Firſt Conſul, what were his Majeſty's intentions with regard to the evacuation of Malta, that the guarantees were *now* ready to come forward, except Ruſſia, without whom the guaranty would be equally complete, and that conſequently Great Britain would have *no pretext for keeping longer poſſeſſion.*"—The paſſage, however, in the Correſpondence, which may be eaſily aſcertained by a reference to it, ſtands, *in reality*, thus: "M. Talleyrand, with great ſolemnity, required of me to inform him, and this by the expreſs order of the Firſt Conſul, what were his Majeſty's intentions with regard to the evacuation of Malta." (Here follow ſix or ſeven lines which are irrelevant to the point I am arguing.) "He ſaid, that another Grand Maſter would now very ſoon be elected; that all the powers of Europe invited ſo to do, with the exception of Ruſſia, whoſe difficulties it was

eaſy to remove, and without whom the guaranty would be equally complete, were ready to come forward; and that, conſequently, the term would very ſoon arrive, when Great Britain could have no pretext for keeping longer poſſeſſion." On comparing theſe two extracts, although, at firſt view, they appear pretty ſimilar, on a critical examination of them we diſcover ſeveral eſſential differences. Our author, it muſt be obſerved, in his falſified copy, has omitted ſeveral words of material import. He has omitted altogether that *another Grand Maſter would now very ſoon be elected*, which proves that he was not *already* elected. He has mutilated the following paſſage: "that all the powers of Europe invited ſo to do, with the exception of Ruſſia, whoſe difficulties it was eaſy to remove, &c. were ready to come forward." He has here even fabricated the word *now*, which is not to be found in the original; and, in the laſt part, "that conſequently the term would very *ſoon* arrive when Great Britain, &c." he has again omitted the words *very ſoon*. Now, certainly, when a man tells me, that, *very ſoon*, I ſhall no longer have a pretext for doing ſo and ſo, he admits that I have one *now*; and, if we had a pretext, we certainly had a right to avail ourſelves of it, conſequently it was a *juſtifiable* pretext. I did not mention *juſtifiable* as an epithet which Talleyrand had annexed, but as a concluſion of

my own; and, by a reference to my pamphlet *, it will be seen, that when I first state the question, I merely say *a pretext*. As for my asserting, that Talleyrand allowed that it would soon be removed, I did not quote these as the *words* of the French minister. I merely put the substance of his opinion in my own language; and what wide distinction there can be between the phrases, "the term would very soon arrive, when Great Britain could have no pretext for keeping longer possession," and that, "we had a pretext which would be speedily removed," I must leave to the discriminating perspicuity of our author to elucidate. The charge of misrepresentation, therefore, in this instance (as I shall soon prove to be the case in every other), only recoils upon himself.

He says (page 35), he will not "go *deeper* into the dispute about the Maltese inhabitants;" and, in this instance, I give him credit for the soundness of his judgment, for he is *already* evidently beyond his depth.

In the next paragraph he notices, that Buonaparte did not wish to conceal his designs against Egypt; that he even told Lord Whitworth; and, adds our author, gifted no doubt with the unerring spirit of prophecy, "*he told him true*," "that sooner or later he would be in possession of that coun-

* Page 41 in the first edition, p. 47 in the second.

try*." This is, no doubt, rather a bold aſſertion; and, recollecting himſelf, page 39, he prudently poſtpones the *fulfilment* of his prophecy to the diſtance of half a century. But whether as a prophet, a logician, or an hiſtorian, he is continually entangling himſelf in ſome freſh abſurdity; and, in endeavouring to get out of one dilemma, he frequently falls into another. Thus, in the aſſertion juſt quoted, in avoiding contradiction by placing the accompliſhment of his prophecy at ſo remote a period, he evidently forgets that he was all along talking of Buonaparte, who, being born in the year 1769, in 1853 (ſhould he be ſo long preſerved for the curſe of mankind), will be in the 85th year of his age.

Our author, purſuing the ſame mode of argumentation in his ſecond, as in his firſt publication, ejaculates every now and then, "Is this, then, a cauſe of war?" or words to that effect. On this manner of interrogation, I muſt beg leave to offer a few comments.

In the ſyſtematic plan of aggreſſion which France unremittingly purſued, although, rather than recommence hoſtilities, our government was for a long time diſpoſed to make conſiderable ſacrifices; yet, perceiving at laſt that non-reſiſtance in them, inſtead of ſoftening and conciliating, only generated additional inſult and en-

* Page 36.

croachment on the part of France, they found it neceſſary (would that they had diſcovered their error earlier!) to check this haughty and overbearing diſpoſition; and, although the point at which they choſe to make a ſtand, may fairly be regarded as *one* of the prominent cauſes of the war, that is not to ſay, that it was the *only* one. A tree, by a ſingle ſtroke from an axe, may not receive much injury, but the blow frequently repeated, at laſt hews it to the ground; and although the final ſtroke be the immediate occaſion of its fall, the others, it muſt be allowed, have been of *ſome* conſequence, and cannot be conſidered as *entirely* innocent of its fate.

Our author ſays, he "pleads for peace, for the repoſe of mankind *;" as if *I* were the enemy of ſuch ineſtimable bleſſings. Under many circumſtances, *I* ſhould alſo plead for them, and ſhall be among the firſt to hail them, the moment they can be obtained with honour, and enjoyed with ſafety. But what kind of peace or repoſe can be hoped from the tyrant of France? As well might a trembling wretch in the fangs of a hungry tiger hope for mercy.

I now come to the ultimatum, at which I am ſincerely glad to arrive, for I grow weary of the controverſy. Our author terms it an *imperious*

* Page 49.

ultimatum. I, he ſays, regard it "as a very *mild* one *." I certainly do. He ought, however, in fairneſs, to have quoted me out, and to have annexed to the term my qualification of it, "conſidering what had paſſed." I ſtill retain my opinion; but as my chief reaſons for retaining it are ſtated in my original work, it would be ſuperfluous to repeat them here.

I again catch our author (page 42) at his old practices. In this inſtance, however, he goes a little farther than uſual, for he not only *miſquotes*, but makes me utter abſolute nonſenſe. We, he avers, ſay to France (what follows is marked all the way through with inverted commas, as my words, and at the concluſion the reader is referred to page 51 of the Reaſon Why †), "You ſee it is impracticable to fulfil our agreement relative to the ceſſion of Malta; you inſult us, and we perceive plainly, mean to quarrel with us: we ſee your intentions, and, in order to eaſe our minds reſpecting your future deſigns upon Egypt, we propoſe that you ſhould let us have perpetual poſſeſſion of Malta;" and, a few lines lower down, marking alſo with inverted commas, and referring to page 52 of my pamphlet, he accuſes me of writing ſuch traſh as this:

* Page 41.

† Page 51 of the firſt edition, is page 59 of the ſecond.

"We will ſay, the King of Etruria is the *King of Etruria*, and the Italian and Ligurian republics are *Italian and Ligurian republics*." Now, if, on conſulting my original pamphlet, from which theſe paſſages are profeſſed to have been *literally* copied (for inverted commas can mean nothing elſe), the reader finds not the language of the firſt quotation, nor the vulgar tautology of the ſecond, what will be his opinion of this *Gentleman?*

Our author is not, however, ſufficiently ſatisfied with this proof of his *gentlemanly* liberality; but, in the very next page, has recourſe to the ſame *genteel* practices. He notices * my aſſertion, that reſpecting the ſatisfaction and counterpoiſe for the acquiſitions of France, Talleyrand, even in diſcuſſing this very point, admitted our claim †. This opinion of mine is founded on Lord Whitworth's letter, marked No. 53 in the Official Correſpondence. Now what is the ingenious ſubterfuge which our author has deviſed to prove the contrary? Why, deſpairing of ſucceſs, even momentary ſucceſs, in any other way, he produces a long extract from the very letter in queſtion, but *purpoſely omits the part to which I refer*, as if it had been ſomething of my own invention. In this very identical letter (No. 53 of the Official Correſpondence), Lord Whitworth ſays, and theſe

* Reply, page 43.

† Page 52, Reaſon Why, firſt edit. p. 60, ſecond.

are the words on which I plainly ground my judgment, "that if the French Government exerciſed a right of extending its influence and territory, in violation of the ſpirit of the treaty of Amiens, Great Britain had, if ſhe choſe to avail herſelf of it, an undoubted right to ſeek a counterpoiſe. He (Talleyrand) did not ſeem inclined to diſpute this poſition, but rather to admit that ſuch a right did exiſt, and might be claimed in conſequence of the acquiſitions which had been made by France."

Lord Hawkeſbury, in his anſwer to Lord Whitworth, on the ſubject of this important letter, begins by ſaying, "His Majeſty has obſerved, with great ſatisfaction, the admiſſion by the French Government of the juſtice of his claim to ſome compenſation in conſequence of the increaſed power and influence of France, ſince the period of the concluſion of the definitive treaty *." But our author, who, as an introduction to a very long extract, profeſſes to give "the main purport" of this official document, and who maliciouſly quotes to throw a diſcredit on my opinion, cautiouſly excludes the very paſſage to which I advert. Really, the method of arguing which our author adopts is ſo ſophiſticated, ſo unphiloſophical, ſo unlike a ſcholar,

* Correſpondence, No. 56.

and ſo unlike a gentleman, that it is a diſguſting taſk to be obliged to purſue him, and to expoſe ſo many groſs examples of *intentional miſrepreſentation.*

In his original work, our author has aſked, "Have we not lighted a firebrand, and hurled it on the continent, to conſume it with inexhauſtible flame? Are we not the weſtern and tempeſtuous blaſt, to drive and urge that flame to the deſtruction of the neighbouring ſtates *?" Having given this ſpecimen of the *nature* and *meaſure* of his veneration and affection for the Britiſh character, he has, in his preſent work, the *condeſcenſion* to allow "that the expreſſion may be ſtrong," even "too ſtrong †;" yet, faſcinated by the dazzling ſublimity of the paſſage, he hankers after it through two or three pages, and, at laſt, by attempting to prove its appoſiteneſs, he allows it to retain its primitive force, and completely does away all the merit of his conceſſion.

When our author accuſes us of being guilty of the misfortunes of Holland and Switzerland ‡, he ſurely forgets that he had before || been endeavouring to prove our impotence, and the folly of our efforts to reſcue Europe from her fate,

* Why do we go to War? 1ſt edition, page 24.

† Reply, page 47. ‡ Page 48. || Page 20.

"that Europe which Buonaparte had conquered, that world that was his own *;" or does he imagine, that every perſon who reads him is to be ſo completely dimmed, both in ſight and recollection, by the blaze of his genius, that he will eſcape detection? But he not only makes us accountable for the fortunes of Holland and Switzerland, but Italy, Naples, and Hanover, are gratuitouſly thrown into the ſcale †. He further obſerves, that theſe ſtates might ſay to us, "Thoſe troops deſtined for Louiſiana and the Weſt, you have driven eaſtward upon us, while you, rolled up like the hedge-hog in ſtationary defence, your navy pointing like ſpines in every direction, remain ſecure and unaſſailable." On this ingenious paſſage, I ſhall make two or three remarks. In the firſt place, we are repreſented as the *drivers* of the French troops, which has not happened yet, but which is very likely to happen, ſhould they come within our reach. In the ſecond place, we are compared to a *hedge-hog* (no very flattering compariſon), and our defence is ſaid to be *ſtationary*, which, as we are continually attacking the French coaſt, is inaccurately ſtated. As to the third point, that we remain ſecure and unaſſailable, although our author contradicts the aſſertion frequently in the

* Reply, page 21. † Page 49.

courſe of his pamphlet, yet in this inſtance he is perhaps correct.

As to our interference in the affairs of Switzerland, he ſignificantly aſks "was this no *breaking* of treaty, or attempt ſo to do*?" Indiſputably not! Switzerland was an independent country, which had been formally acknowledged as ſuch by France and the other great continental powers, and, finding itſelf threatened with a foreign yoke, had a *right* to apply for our good offices, which we had a *right* to grant; and had we ſucceeded in our views, ſo far from *breaking our treaty*, we ſhould only have prevented the French from *breaking theirs*.

As for the phraſe of *every one* has read the Correſpondence, with which our author finds fault, every liberal-minded man will underſtand it as a common mode of expreſſion, when a publication has been *generally* read. I certainly did not mean, that *every individual human being in the Britiſh empire* had performed that taſk, and I willingly admit, that our author is *critically* exact, when he *politely* ſays, "Every one has *not* read the Correſpondence†." This is the only victory which he has gained, and a moſt glorious and important one it is. I muſt, however, beg leave to rectify a ſlight error into which he has

* Page 50. † Ibid.

inadvertently fallen, a few lines farther on. He charges me with having written ſixty-four pages to unravel the Correſpondence *. Now he really totally miſtakes the matter. I did not write my *ſixty-four* pages to *unravel* the Correſpondence, but to *unravel* his comments upon it, to detect his artifices, and to expoſe his miſrepreſentations.

Our author (page 53) inquires, "And does the writer (meaning me) imagine that the unanimity diſplayed in the willing preparation for defence againſt invaſion, is a proof of unanimity as to the policy and neceſſity of the war?" I anſwer, I certainly do. If, for example, the Government, in the judgment of the people, had acted wrong, and had criminally involved the country in an unjuſt and unneceſſary war, a backwardneſs to eſpouſe their cauſe would have been diſcovered by the people, which would have embarraſſed all their movements, and have forced them to a reaſonable conceſſion. If, however, the enemy, having contemptuouſly rejected that conceſſion, ſtill threatened invaſion and extermination, a different queſtion would immediately have ariſen. The aggrieved would then have become the aggreſſor, inaſmuch as the puniſhment would have exceeded the of-

* The 1ſt edition of the Reaſon Why contained 64 pages.

ſence, and the people, rather than be ſubdued, would undoubtedly have armed in their defence. But our preſent caſe is widely different, nor has any ſuch doubt or heſitation been manifeſted. On the contrary, the people, long before the war took place, foreſaw the probability of ſuch an event, and, the moment the cauſes of it were explained to them, perceiving that it was neceſſary to their ſalvation, they voluntarily and inſtantaneouſly decided how to act. They were unanimous from the outſet, and their zeal has been augmented, and their opinion corroborated, by reflection. The extreme caſe which our author cites, and the nice diſtinction which he deduces, are therefore worth nothing.

Towards the concluſion of his "Reply," he *apparently* applauds* as profligate a ſentiment as was ever uttered by man, and which, if no other accuſation could be alleged againſt Buonaparte, would ſtamp him a villain. This arch uſurper did certainly propoſe to Lord Whitworth, that the army of France ſhould be united to the navy of Britain, that theſe two powerful ſtates might be able to "govern the world," and to divide the ſpoils between them†. Does then the greatneſs of the theft exonerate or exculpate the thief? It would have been a partnerſhip, no doubt, conſonant with the rapacious and perfi-

* Page 55. † Correſpondence, No. 38.

dious views of the French cabinet, but ſuch as could only awaken the indignant ſcorn of thoſe who are actuated by the principles of Britiſh juſtice; and had we been capable of forming ſuch a connexion, I have no heſitation in ſaying, that we ſhould have deſerved to periſh.

A little lower down, he furniſhes us with a ſpecimen of the fertility of his imagination, and talks ſo wildly of ſlumbers and dreams, ſhadows and ſpectres, and aërial combats, and gives ſuch notable proofs of ſublime conception and fanciful invention, that, had he continued long in that ſtrain, he would have driven all politics from my head, and led me to believe that I was reading ſome wonder-working romance. But he ſuddenly calls us back to the main ſubject, by ſaying, "I will ſuppoſe for a moment, that the projected invaſion ſucceeds *," though he does give us to underſtand, that, although in his opinion it is not *probable*, it is ſtill *poſſible*.—There is a riſk inſeparable from all ſplendid achievements, a myſterious uncertainty about which the mind of man can never be entirely at reſt. All that depends upon us, we muſt endeavour to accompliſh; the reſt we muſt leave to the controlling ordinations of that mighty and merciful Providence who judges of our motives, and who, we muſt humbly hope,

* Page 56.

will reward our exertions. Should we thus be doomed to periſh, I truſt that our fall will not be unworthy of our paſt fame. We ſhall, at leaſt, have done what men can do; and, in our laſt moments, ſhall have the heart-felt conſolation of having diſcharged the moſt ſacred of all duties, that of ſacrificing ourſelves for the defence of our country: and, as it is incomparably preferable to die with glory than to live with infamy, there is no room for deliberation on our choice.

Our author, ſenſitively alive to my having accuſed him, in my original work, of getting into a kind of Cretan labyrinth, in his "Reply," retorts the charge, and ſays, "It ſeems, indeed, a labyrinth, which he (meaning me) cannot, nor does he attempt to *extricate* himſelf out of;" and, by way of proving the *juſtice* of his remark, he adds, "but with the wings of Dædalus *eſcapes* all intricacies, flies over ſeas, over gulphs, and deſarts, &c.*" Now, although our author has evidently, throughout both his pamphlets, been very anxious to eſtabliſh his reputation as a ſcholar; and, in proof of his knowledge of languages, has, in the courſe of his labours, quoted Greek, Latin, French, and Italian, yet he has, in this inſtance, ſtumbled on a moſt unfortunate claſſical illuſtration, as it proves the direct reverſe of what he is ſo deſirous to enforce.

* Page 57.

I, at leaſt, have always heard Dædalus commended for his ſkill; and ſo highly did the ancients think of his ſuperior intelligence, that his name has, in more inſtances than one, become proverbial. But our author would, no doubt, have been better pleaſed, if, inſtead of paſſing over gulfs, and ſeas, and *deſerts*, *unhurt* (pretty places, truly, to tarry in), I had rather imitated Icarus, who, poſſeſſing more temerity and leſs judgment than his father, was drowned on his paſſage. Thus, if the ſimile applies at all, it is certainly in *my* favour, and I have to thank our author for the high compliment he has, *unwittingly*, paid me.

Quitting the wings of Dædalus, in the ſame ſentence he introduces ſome nonſenſe of his own invention, as a part of my pamphlet. *His* words are theſe: "In anſwer to my quere, whether we ſhould be *utterly*" (a term not in the original) "ruined and undone, even by the loſs of India, which I placed at a ſcarce poſſible extremity, he ſays" (meaning me), "I really think *we ſhould be*: and not, it appears by the loſs of that acknowledged ſource of wealth, but becauſe, we ſhould then ſurrender our iſland, the iſland of Great Britain, the moment the French choſe to ſummon us to do it." Now, by a reference to the Reaſon Why *, *my* anſwer to *his* queſtion will be found

* Page 59 of the firſt edition, page 67 of the ſecond.

to run thus: "I really think we *ſhould be*; *for if we had not the courage to go to war for the preſervation of ſuch objects, we ſhould not only, by their loſs, be deprived of an immenſe ſource of proſperity and wealth, but all ſenſe of honour, and all love of glory, would be already extinct*; *and the moment the French ſummoned our own iſland to ſubmit, we ſhould, in all probability, ſurrender it.*" The leaſt attentive reader muſt, at the ſlighteſt glance, perceive the wide diſtinction between theſe two paſſages. Had he only changed the language, as he does not, in this inſtance, purſue his uſual mode, and mark it with inverted commas, I ſhould have made no objection; but, having completely marred the ſenſe, it is an act of juſtice which I owe to myſelf to expoſe him.

Our author now favours us with a few curſory remarks on trade, by which he evinces his profound knowledge of the commercial intereſts of this country; and, having afforded this unqueſtionable proof of his *commercial ſagacity* *, he concludes with a ſimilar one of his *political ſagacity* †. He here indulges us with his ideas of peace, which exhibit ſuch a ſplendid ſpecimen of foreſight and penetration, that I expect that petitions will ſhortly be preſented from all parts of his Majeſty's dominions, humbly praying him to appoint this gentleman his prime-miniſter,

* Page 59. † Ibid.

that the nation, in these arduous and portentous times, may be assisted by his talents, redeemed from present jeopardy, and secured, beyond the possibility of deterioration, in the full enjoyment of those peculiar blessings by which it has been so long distinguished. By following our author's advice, we should, *indeed*, "shut the gates," and "turn the key" too, not, however, as he states, "against discord," but against many of our most obvious and vital interests.

In the above examination of our author's "Reply," I have been carried, much against my will, to a considerable length; but, when the many parts are considered, which I have been compelled to notice *, I hope no other excuse will be

* I should observe, that besides the parts of our author's last pamphlet, which I have exposed, there are numerous instances of incorrect quotations, such as (page 11), 'Insurmountable *objects* were instantly *stated* by France," instead of "insurmountable *objections* were instantly *started* by France." Reason Why, p. 15, first edit. p. 16, second. (Page 34) "Injure the privileges of the Maltese," instead of, "disfranchise the native inhabitants," Reason Why, p. 41, first edit. p. 47, second. (Page 36) "In short, it was among those provocations, those reproaches, and those encroachments, that it would not only place Malta, but *England*, at the disposal of France:" instead of, "Were we still to go on, submitting to provocations, enduring reproaches, and acquiescing in encroachment, till not only Malta, but England, was at the disposal of France." Reason Why, p. 44, first edit. p. 50, second. The reader will remark, that, in all these passages, not only the language, but the sense, is altered.

deemed neceſſary. Anxious, however, as I am to diſmiſs the ſubject, I muſt ſtill ſay a few words before I take my *final* leave.

With regard to the reproach of my being a "*hireling*" and a "*ſtipendiary*" of Government, I can, with the moſt perfect good-humour, acquaint our author, that, in this bold aſſertion, he is as wide from the truth, as he is in moſt of the other parts of his two pamphlets. But as he founds his conjecture on the part I have taken, in defence of the cauſe of my country, by the expoſure of his fallacy and miſrepreſentation, and on the ſucceſs with which I have cleared her from thoſe aſperſions, with which the impotent malignity of his pen has endeavoured to load her—I feel perfectly indifferent about his opinion. I might, if I choſe to follow ſo bad an example, and I am ſure with much more apparent reaſon, accuſe *him* of being *the hireling and ſtipendiary of France*, but

Yet all theſe quotations are marked with inverted commas, and references are given to the particular pages of my pamphlet. This is ſufficient to ſatisfy the generality of readers, who, in theſe reſpects, uſually give credit to an author for his fidelity. There are, beſides, innumerable quibbles and evaſions, which it would be endleſs to notice. Our author furniſhes, however, two inſtances (there may be others), page 46, and page 48, that he *can*, when he *chooſes*, quote *correctly*; but the reaſon of his accuracy in theſe paſſages is evident, as he thinks it enables him to give additional force to his own arguments.

this I ſhall not do, as ſuch angry inſinuations neither ſtrengthen nor invalidate argument, and only furniſh common-place ſpecimens of vulgar wit*. I, therefore, ſeriouſly admoniſh

* To this remark I ſhall juſt add one ſingle queſtion: Whether is he who defends the cauſe of his country, or he who writes againſt that cauſe, and who exerts and *perverts* all his talents to frame an apology for the acts of a government, which, to uſe his own words, is *threatening* us "with a tremendous and irreſiſtible invaſion †," moſt likely to be under undue influence? The cauſe which I have eſpouſed is both natural and honourable, and I am ſure it is that which every true and loyal Briton will cheerfully and ſteadfaſtly ſupport. Our author, in the firſt page of his "Reply," boaſts of his loyalty, which I, founding my opinion on the part he had volunteered, had, in the Reaſon Why, rather impeached. Fearful, however, that he had not ſufficiently eſtabliſhed his reputation for that quality, in the courſe of his "Reply," that he may place it beyond the reach of all ſlanderous ſuſpicion, he employs the following reſpectful and endearing epithets: page 20, We are a "little iſland, idle, uſeleſs, vain-boaſting:" page 23, We are a "very fooliſh nation:" page 24, We aſſume a pre-eminence we are not entitled to; we have confirmed the misfortunes of the continent; and "are trembling for the ſafety of our own capital:" page 25, "We break our faith, ſully our honour, blaſt our fame, and riſk our exiſtence for no object, at leaſt a light one:" page 31, We remind our author of a certain philoſopher, who, in making experiments on the organs of ſight, "nearly put out his eyes by ſqueezing them:" page 38, We light up the flame of war "becauſe we inſiſt on retaining a rocky iſland, which we were under a ſolemn compact to reſign:' page 40, We have "every op-

† *Reply, page* 56.

him, in future, if he diſdain to ſhew more diſcretion, at leaſt to give a colourable pretence for his judgment; and moſt ſincerely do I aſſure him, that, in bringing a charge of ſuch a nature againſt me, which he alſo delivers *, and repeats †, in pretty poſitive language, as far as concerns myſelf, its total non-application renders it perfectly innoxious, and, as far as concerns *him*, it only adds one to the numerous inſtances of the leading defect of his writings, which prove, that, however confident and dogmatical, he may ſtill be wrong.

Conſidering the method he has purſued, both in his examination of the Correſpondence, and of the Reaſon Why, which, I truſt, I have fully explained; I might, and with a ſtrict re-

probrium of breach of faith to contend with:" page 49, We are firſt "lighting up the flame of war," and have "ſet fire to the combuſtible matter in France:" two lines farther on, We are "rolled up like the hedge-hog in ſtationary defence:" and two lines ſtill farther, We are metamophoſed into a "blaſt driving the flame ſtill eaſtward, through Greece to Conſtantinople:" (really all this fine imagery ſhould have been reſerved for ſome pantomimical entertainment, for the amuſement of children during the Chriſtmas holidays:) and laſtly, page 58, by way of the grand cataſtrophe, The Mediterranean is likely to become "a bottomleſs pit to ſwallow up the ſeamen and treaſure of this iſland."

* Why do we go to War? additional leaf to the 2d edition.

† Reply, pages 1 and 4.

gard to juſtice, have treated him with much greater ſeverity; but he has placed himſelf ſo *entirely* at my mercy, that he has, in ſome degree, excited my compaſſion, and I have not been deſirous of puſhing him to extremities. As, however, he may not always meet with ſo lenient an adverſary, I will take the liberty of giving him a counſel before we part (and a *better* his *beſt* friend cannot give); which is, ſhould he ever write again, attentively to bear in mind, that declamation is not argument, that aſſertion is not fact, and that accuſation is not proof.

THE END.

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